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GETTING PROPERTY RIGHT: “INFORMAL” 
MORTGAGES IN THE JAPANESE COURTS 
Frank G. Bennett, Jr.† 
Abstract: In Japan’s civil law property system, courts recognize a form of extra-
statutory security, the jōto tanpo or “title-transfer security interest,” that is created by 
conveying legal title to the creditor, with a promise to restore it to the debtor upon 
repayment.  Although best known today as a means to providing security in movables, 
jōto tanpo was originally an alternative means of mortgaging real estate, and this latter 
use of the interest is the subject of this Article. 
The two early attractions of the jōto tanpo interest to creditors were 1) the ability to 
avoid inefficient procedures for the enforcement of the Code-defined security interests, 
and 2) the possibility of enjoying a forfeiture of the collateral upon default.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, courts and the legislature sought to control lender overreaching in connection 
with several “non-Code” forms of security relating to immoveable property.  The jōto 
tanpo has survived efforts at reform, and remains as a potential strong-arm device in 
high-interest lending and high-pressure debt collection.  The two factors that this Article 
identifies as inhibiting effective judicial discipline of this category of transactions today 
include 1) limitations in Japan’s system of registered title and 2) procedural lacunae that 
open the possibility of enforcement arbitrage. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We worked through Spring and Winter, through Summer and through Fall 
But the mortgage worked the hardest and the steadiest of us all 
It worked on nights and Sundays, it worked each holiday 
Settled down among us and it never went away 
~American Traditional Ballad1 
 
Among Japan’s so-called “non-Code” security interests,2 jōto tanpo 
claims pride of place as one of the oldest and most finely tuned judicial 
accretions to that nation’s civil law.  Commonly translated as “title-transfer 
                                           
†
 Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University.  In the preparation of this 
research, invaluable comments were received from Bui Thi Mai Lan, Honma Yasunori, Itō Kōsuke, Jimbo 
Fumio, Morigiwa Yasutomo, Nakaya Hiroki, Andrew Pardieck, Mark Ramseyer, and Tadaka Hirotaka.  
Any errors, omissions, or infelicities are my own doing.  
1
 RY COODER, Taxes on the Farmer Feeds Us All, on INTO THE PURPLE VALLEY (Reprise Records 
1972).  Will Carleton is the original author of this ballad.  See NEBRASKA FOLKLORE (BOOK TWO) 7-8 
(Robert E. Carlsen ed., 1940), available at http://www.nebraskahistory.org/museum/teachers/ 
material/nebdata/book2.pdf (attributing authorship to Will Carleton circa 1890 and titling the song “But the 
Mortgage Worked the Hardest”).  See also FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, NEBRASKA FOLKLORE 
PAMPHLETS NO. 16 (1937-1940) (titling the song “The Mortgage Worked the Hardest”); Irwin Silber & 
Earl Robinson, SONGS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN WEST 236-39 (1995) (titling the song “The Farmer is the 
Man”). 
2
 The descriptive Japanese phrase for security interests not specified in the Civil Code is hi-tenkei 
tanpo. 
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security,”3 the practice of offering bare legal title as collateral to secure debt 
is a long-standing practice in Japan; it has been used to enable transactions 
not contemplated by the literal text of the Civil Code since before its 
enactment.4  Both movable and immovable property can be the subject of a 
jōto tanpo interest.5   In the latter case, with which this Article will be 
concerned, it offers an alternative to other, more orthodox devices, and is 
typically chosen for the considerable procedural advantages that it gives to 
the secured party. 
With respect to real estate in particular, jōto tanpo is an island of 
tradition in an area awash with reform.  In recent years, legislators and the 
courts have engaged in a tag-team effort to rein in high-risk, high-interest 
lending, much to the cost of that industry.6  Rate caps have been stiffened,7 
marketing efforts restricted, 8  and debt collectors criminalized.9   Lenders 
have even been denied the freedom to take out suicide insurance on their 
debtors.10  Judicial decisions that prefaced successive waves of legislation in 
this line have attracted some overseas criticism, as evidence of an unhealthy 
                                           
3
 See, e.g., Hideo Morii, Secured Transactions: Title-Transfer Security (Jōto Tanpo), in 3-5 DOING 
BUSINESS IN JAPAN §§ 5.01-5.05 (Zentaro Kitagawa, ed. 1980, updated twice/year) [hereinafter Hideo 
Morii, Title-Transfer Security]. 
4
 TADAKA HIROTAKA, TANPO HŌ TAIKEI NO ARATA NA TENKAI: JŌTO TANPO O CHŪSHIN TOSHITE 
[NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF SECURED CLAIMS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JŌTO TANPO] 121-22 
(1996). 
5
 John O. Haley, The Preliminary Contract for Substitute Performance: A Reflection of the 
Japanese Judicial Approach, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 133, 138 (1974). 
6
 Andrew Pardieck, Japan and the Moneylenders: Activist Courts and Substantive Justice, 17 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 580-81 (2008). 
7
 See Risoku seigen hō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 4, as amended by 
Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the 
Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 155 of 1999, art. 3 [hereinafter Amending Act of 1999]; 
Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari ni kansuru hōritsu [Investment Receipt, 
Deposits and Interest Rate Regulation Act], Law No. 195 of 1954, art. 5, as amended by Amending Act of 
1999, supra note 7, art. 2, also as amended by Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei 
suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 115 of 2006, art. 6 
[hereinafter Amending Act of 2006].  For a detailed account of recent developments in the law relating to 
consumer lending, see Pardieck, supra note 6, at 564-65, 571-80. 
8
 See Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of 
1983, art. 11(2), 15(1), 15(2), 16, 20, 21, 24/6, 48(3), 49(2), 49(5), 49(6), as amended by Kashikingyō no 
kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu oyobi shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari ni kansuru 
hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the Lending Business Regulation Act and the 
Investment Receipt, Deposits and Interest Oversight Act], Law No. 136 of 2003 (cited subarticles contained 
in the amendments) [hereinafter Amending Act of 2003]; Pardieck, supra note 6, at 564. 
9
 See Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of 
1983, secs. 21(1), 21(2), 49(8), as amended by Amending Act of 2003, supra note 8, art. 47, also amended 
by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 1; Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari 
ni kansuru hōritsu [Investments, Deposits and Interest Rate Regulation Act], Law no. 195 of 1954, art. 5(3), 
as amended by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 6. 
10
 Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of 
1983, art. 12 § 7, as amended by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 2. 
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judicial activism in the field of commercial relations.11  At the same time, the 
doctrine underpinning jōto tanpo against real estate—a security and 
collection device favored by lenders of last resort12—remains untouched, 
despite a well-deserved reputation for severity, and a potential for capricious 
abuse.13 
A jōto tanpo mortgage is a simple transaction, in which the ownership 
of collateral is transferred directly to the lender, with a promise to reconvey 
upon repayment. 14   Japanese courts are exceptionally permissive toward 
such an arrangement.  German law recognizes a like transaction with respect 
to real property but encumbered with such formalities, fees, and tax burdens 
that creditors do not use it.15  The classic English mortgage has a similar 
formal structure, but is encased in elaborate foreclosure proceedings that are 
not found in Japan.16  In the United States, the contract for deed closely 
resembles jōto tanpo in many respects, but is only available for purchase 
money transactions, and is subject to statutory restrictions at the state level17 
(beyond which, it has been described by a Reporter of the Restatement of 
Property as having “no place in a modern land financing system”).18  There 
are practical limitations to the use of jōto tanpo,19 but for better or for worse, 
it does not suffer from such legal encumbrances.20 
This Article will argue that three factors determine the characteristics 
of jōto tanpo:  1) the pressure of commercial custom; 2) limitations in 
Japan’s title registration system; and 3) opportunities for enforcement 
arbitrage.  These factors are stable for the present, but will not necessarily 
remain so.  Japan is in the midst of an ambitious program of commercial law 
reform,21 in which there is extensive academic participation.22  Proposed 
                                           
11 Pardieck, supra note 6, at 380-81 (citing Yuka Hayashi, Japan’s Lending Crackdown May Hurt 
Foreign Consumer-Finance Investors, WALL ST. J, Dec. 13, 2006, at C1). 
12
 See YOSHIDA MASUMI, JŌTO TANPO 231 (1979). 
13
 See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 215. 
14
 See, e.g., Imai v. Takachi, 48 MINSHŪ 414, 422 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 1994) (describing such a 
transaction). 
15
 TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 14-15. 
16
 FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS, 132-138 (3d ed. 1896). 
17
 Grant Nelson, The Contract for Deed as a Mortgage: The Case for the Restatement Approach, 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1111, 1117. 
18 Id. at 1115-16. 
19
 See infra Part IV. 
20
 John. O. Haley has written that the jōto tanpo “corresponds to a common law mortgage”.  Haley, 
supra note 5, at 134-35.  This should be taken as a loose characterization only.  As discussed below in this 
Article, collateral under a jōto tanpo differs from mortgaged property in that it can be sold at will 
immediately upon default, is exposed to the risk of attachment by creditors of the lender, and is not subject 
to the restraining force of a persistent equity of redemption. 
21 See, e.g., Hideki Kanda, Securitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 359, 360 (1998) (“In 
November 1995, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a drastic reform plan of financial regulation known 
466 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 3 
 
revisions to the Civil Code, spanning property law and the law of 
obligations, were presented at the annual meeting of the Japan Private Law 
Association23 in October 2008.24  The contemplated scope of this revision 
does not extend to law of secured claims,25 but there are certainly indications 
of eventual movement in this direction.26 
Like the English law of mortgage, the current state of judicially 
fashioned rules for jōto tanpo transactions in land—and, by extension, in 
movables—cannot be understood without some sense of its historical 
foundations.  This Article attempts to provide that background, with a view 
to improved overseas engagement in this evolving area of Japanese 
commercial law.27  Beyond this narrow objective, review of the evolutionary 
interaction of procedure and substantive law in this niche of the Japanese 
property system may serve as a useful referent for ongoing reform efforts in 
countries that have recently expanded the role of property markets in their 
domestic economies. 
Part I of this Article examines this early period of legal development, 
leading up to the adoption of a formal doctrine to justify recognition of jōto 
tanpo claims.  Part II provides an overview of procedural flaws in the 
                                                                                                                              
as Japan’s Big Bang.” (citation omitted)); Peter Lawley, Panacea or Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effect of the Japanese Committee System Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 
105, 111 (2007) (“In May 2002, the National Diet of Japan passed legislation amending the Commercial 
Code to allow for the committee system corporate governance structure.”); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK 
D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL 
AND INFORMAL RULES 9, 22 (2004) (analyzing the effects of a reduction in the filing fee for shareholder 
derivative suits); Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview: Japanese Law at a Turning Point, in LAW IN 
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, at xx (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (“The extent of change in the legal realm is 
exemplified, above all, by one set of events:  the Justice System Reform Council of 1999-2001 . . . and the 
reforms resulting from that council’s recommendations.  Several chapters in this volume describe specific 
aspects of the Reform Council’s recommendations and resulting reforms.”); Shōzō Ota, Reform of Civil 
Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2001) (providing an account of the drafting process and 
context of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1996, with reflections on its likely effects). 
22
 See Katō Masanobu, ‘Nihon minpō kaisei shian’ no kihon wakugumi [The Basic Framework of a 
“Japanese Civil Code Revision Proposal”], 1362 JURISUTO 2, 3 (2008); Tsubaki Toshio, Hashigaki: 
honshō tanjō no yurai o chūshin ni [Preface: Concerning the Origin of This Volume], in MINPŌ KAISEI O 
KANGAERU [CIVIL CODE REVISION VOICES], (Hōritsu jihō zōkan [Hōritsu jihō Special Issue], Tsubaki 
Toshio et al. eds., 2008). 
23 The Japanese name for this organization is Nihon Shihō Gakkai. 
24
 See Katō Masanobu, supra note 22, at 2-4. 
25
 Id. at 3. 
26
 Id.; see, e.g., Okino Masami, UNCITRAL tanpo torihiki rippō gaido no sakutei [Finalization of the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions], 1842 KINYŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 14 (2008) (describing the 
plans of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law regarding secured transactions). 
27 To the best of the author’s knowledge, the following is a comprehensive list of publications in 
English that touch on this area:  HISASHI TANIKAWA ET AL., CREDIT AND SECURITY IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 120-137 (Univ. of Queensland Press 1973) (containing a chapter on 
“Security Transfers”); Haley, supra note 5; HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 167-168 (1999) (containing a 
chapter on “Atypical Real Security Rights”);  Morii Hideo, Title-Transfer Security, supra note 3. 
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enforcement of civil judgments that became apparent during Japan’s period 
of rapid economic growth.  This is an important foundation for 
understanding developments in case law.  The difficulty of realizing 
collateral on default, as well as shortcomings in the substantive law of real 
security itself, induced reliance on so-called non-Code security interests, 28 
including jōto tanpo.  Part III covers the important judicial and legislative 
effort in the 1970s to curb the anachronistic remedy of forfeiture, originally 
embraced in the early century’s heyday of laissez-faire ideology.  Part IV 
examines three recent cases of the Japanese Supreme Court involving jōto 
tanpo, setting their holdings against functionally similar rules in common 
law jurisdictions.  This comparison reveals the differing procedural 
constraints under which Japanese courts operate, as well as tensions between 
transactional efficiency and the jōto tanpo interest.  The utility of jōto tanpo 
as a real estate security device, and the potential for curtailing its use, is the 
subject of Part V.  The conclusion attempts to relate this discussion to recent 
scholarship touching on Japanese property law. 
A. Jōto Tanpo Was an Unplanned Byproduct of Japan’s Nineteenth 
Century Legal Transition 
One of the most important transformative measures taken by the 
Meiji-era reform government after ousting the Tokugawa Shogunate, in 
1868, was the settlement of ownership deeds to land.29  In the previous era, 
farmers were bound to their holdings in principle30 and transfers of land 
were possible only under narrowly circumscribed conditions.31  The issuance 
of land deeds undermined the old order by making land freely alienable.32  
However, the government’s more immediate objective was fiscal; the 
ownership scheme provided a platform for the implementation of an annual 
cash tax on land, needed by the young government to cover the significant 
costs of co-opting stakeholders in the preexisting regime such as the samurai 
                                           
28
 See 4 SHIN HANREI KOMENTĀRU MINPŌ [COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT] 91-92 
(Shinozuka Shōji & Maeda Tatsuaki eds. 1991) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT]. 
29
 See ISHII RYŌSUKE, JAPANESE CULTURE IN THE MEIJI ERA: LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA 180 
(William Chambliss trans., 1958). 
30
 See LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN: INTRODUCTION 12-13 (John Henry Wigmore ed., 
1969); LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN: CIVIL CUSTOMARY LAW 11 (John Henry Wigmore ed., 
1967). 
31
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Meiji shoki ni okeru tochi tanpo hō no keisei [The Formation of Mortgage 
Law in the Early Meiji Period], 24 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI 203, 214-15 (1974) [hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa, 
Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period]. 
32
 See ISHII RYŌSUKE, supra note 29, at 180. 
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(whose stipends were cashed out by the new government).33  An ordinance 
promulgated on July 28, 1873 ultimately established this tax and ownership 
system.34  The rules of ownership that underpinned this ordinance emerged 
in a flurry of orders issued over the course of the preceding year. 
The foundation order removing restraints on alienation was given by 
the Grand Council of State on February 15, 1872.35  The first order on the 
issuance of land deeds was made by the Ministry of Finance on February 24, 
1872,36 but was replaced by a revising order on July 4 of the same year.37  
Neither of the two implementing orders specified which party to a mortgage 
should receive the land deed issued by the state, despite the fact that such 
arrangements were common at the village level in Tokugawa Japan.38  In 
response to consternation at the local level, an interim memorandum on 
mortgages was sent out to local officials on June 18, 1872.39  This was 
replaced by a regulation issued by the Grand Council of State in the 
following year, on January 17, 1873,40 and was clarified by a further order 
on February 14, 1873.41  As this progression of events illustrates, reformers 
were forced to adapt the emergent system of marketable title and security to 
the contours of preexisting feudal interests. 
B. Prior Law Distinguished True Security Arrangements from Fictional 
Foreclosures 
Mortgages at the end of the Tokugawa period were of two types, each 
associated with a distinctive procedure and enforcement mechanism. 42  
Interests which were subject to a closely circumscribed and recorded “main 
suit” procedure were enforced through a forfeiture of the borrower’s interest 
                                           
33
 See Stephen Vlastos, Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF JAPAN: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 367, 373-74 (Marius B. Jansen & John Whitney Hall eds., 
1989). 
34
 Chiso kaisei jōrei [Land Reform Ordinance], Dajōkan Ordinance No. 272 of 1873. 
35 Jisho eidai baibai o yurusu [Permanent Sales of Estates to be Permitted], Dajōkan Ordinance No. 
50 of 1872. 
36
 Jisho baibai jōto ni tsuki chiken watashikata kisoku [Regulation on the Provision of Deeds for the 
Conveyance of Estates], Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 25 of 1872.   
37
 Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 83 of 1872. 
38
 Fujiwara Akihisa, Chiso kaisei ni okeru shichichi kannkei no shobun [On the Disposition of 
Security Relationships in the Process of the Land-Tax Reform], 25 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI 1, 2-3 (1975) 
[hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships]. 
39
 Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215. 
40
 Jisho shichiire kakiire kisoku [Rules for the Mortgage and Pledge of Estates], Dajōkan Ordinance 
No. 18 of 1873. 
41 See Dajōkan Ordinance No. 51 of 1873.  See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security 
Relationships, supra note 38, at 4-5. 
42
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 204. 
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in the land by a form of absolute foreclosure.43  Such agreements were often 
collusive; the lender typically went into possession at the time the loan was 
made, and used a later claim for direct foreclosure to circumvent the general 
ban on land transfers.44  In such transactions, the period under the “loan” 
might be characterized in modern terms as a protracted escrow, because the 
true intention of the parties was to transfer title, and ultimate proprietorship 
was ambiguous before the transfer was finalized.  Mortgages not in this 
category were enforceable through a less closely regulated “money suit” 
procedure,45 where the remedy was to extract payment through an auction of 
the collateral, with the residue being restored to the debtor.46  These latter 
were genuine lending arrangements, in which the debtor remained in 
possession during the term of the loan.47 
The initial rules on the settlement of deeds were found lacking on two 
issues.  First, the settlement of title itself demanded resolution of the 
competing claims of would-be “main suit” lenders and their debtors. 48  
Second, it was necessary to clarify the respective remedy or remedies (i.e. 
sale by auction or direct foreclosure) to be applied to security arrangements 
entered into before, and after, the watershed date of February 15, 1872 (the 
point at which restraints on alienation were lifted).49  The memorandum of 
June 1872 and the string of regulations issuing from January 1873 addressed 
these issues. 
The first memorandum of June 1872, issued by the Ministry of 
Finance, provided, in effect, that the rules set forth in the formal law of the 
Tokugawa (kujikata osadamegaki)50 be applied uniformly to all mortgage 
arrangements, including lender-in-possession cases in which the underlying 
                                           
43
 See id. at 223-24; Fujiwara Akihisa, Shichichi kosaku no hōteki kōzō to jinushisei [The Legal 
Structure of Tenancy Pledges and Its Relation to the Landholder System], 22 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI Nos. 3 
& 4, at 1, 19-21 (1973) [hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa, Tenancy Pledges]. 
44
 See Ōmi Kōji, Wagakuni ni okeru jōto tanpo no seiritsu katei: nihon tanpo hō shi ni okeru jōto 
tanpo no ichizuke (1) [The Establishment of Jōto Tanpo in the Law of Our Nation: The Posture of Jōto 
Tanpo in Japanese Legal History (1)], 27 WASEDA HŌGAKKAISHI 159, 165-66, 171-72 (1976). 
45
 Id. at 173. 
46
 Id. 
47
 See generally Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38 (providing a 
detailed account of difficulties that arose at the prefectural level in implementing national rules that treated 
all pledgors as legal title holders, when in fact some were genuine borrowers and remained in possession, 
and some entered into the lending transaction intending to surrender their interest, and had ceded 
possession to the lender). 
48
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38, at 4. 
49
 See id. 
50
 See OSADAMEGAKI GEKAN [OSAKAMEGAKI, BOOK 2], TOKUGAWA KINREIKŌ BEKKAN 
[PROHIBITIONS OF THE TOKUGAWA, SUPPLEMENT], sec. 31 at 72-74 (Ishii Ryōsuke ed., 1961), translated in 
41 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOC’Y OF JAPAN 683, 717-21 (John Carey Hall trans., 1913). 
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loan was (arguably) a legal fiction.51  This simplified the settling of title; the 
deed for any property subject to mortgage, of whatever type, was to be 
issued to the mortgagor. 52   After issuance, where the lender was in 
possession, the deed was to be delivered to him (voluntarily), to be held 
during the term of the loan arrangement.53  This memorandum was but a 
stopgap measure.  The bifurcation of “main suit” and “money suit” 
procedures had been, in effect, a system of strict pleading with two 
streams. 54   More detailed guidance would be required to give the new 
national rules the same scope of coverage as preexisting practice. 
C. Legal Uncertainty Drove Parties to Adopt Ad Hoc Solutions 
The regulation of January 17, 1873 attempted to establish a more 
complete set of rules for the creation and enforcement of mortgage claims.  
This instrument was initially drafted in the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), 
with input from the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) before promulgation.55  The 
remedial provisions introduced by the MOJ reveal differing policy 
preferences within government.56  The regulation defined two separate forms 
of security in land, both created by endorsement of the title deed: a land 
pledge in which the lender entered into possession (shichiire), and a land 
charge in which he did not (kakiire). 57   For interests created after the 
watershed date of February 15, 1872, the remedy for default in both land 
pledge and land charge agreements was specified, following the MOJ 
position, to be a public sale, with the residue to be returned to the debtor.58 
The MOF favored the remedy of direct foreclosure, although it lost 
the policy debate in the short term.  This differing stance of the two 
institutions appears to have been driven by their respective levels of 
exposure to and sympathy for foreign law.  The MOJ was in the process of 
studying the French Civil Code.59  The view at the MOJ was that direct 
foreclosure, abhorrent to French law, had existed in the previous era solely 
                                           
51
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215; Ōmi Kōji, 
supra note 44, at 163. 
52
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38, at 3-4. 
53
 Id. 
54
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165. 
55
 See id. at 164-65; Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 
216-24. 
56
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 216-24. 
57
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165-66, 171-72; Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early 
Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215. 
58
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 164-66. 
59
 See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 233-34. 
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as a means of circumventing the ban on sales of land.60  Accordingly, it was 
appropriate under both types of security arrangement to require that the 
debtor’s equity in the collateral be respected.61  The MOF sought a closer 
adherence to the formalities of prior law and retention of the remedy of 
direct foreclosure, but the MOJ position became the governing rule in the 
pre-Civil Code period.62 
Even after the pronouncement of January 17 and its sister regulations, 
officials struggled to apply this newly fashioned secured lending framework 
to the varied tapestry of preexisting regional law and local practice.63  In 
response to this uncertainty, parties at the local level sought more stable 
ways of backing up their promises.  A frequently adopted solution was to 
create a rough equivalent to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (i.e. signing 
the deed to the land serving as collateral over to the lender), in the 
expectation that it be returned upon repayment of the underlying loan.64  
This arrangement had the advantage of a kind of brutal clarity; because the 
lender had title to the land, he could enforce his interest by evicting the 
borrower, working a forfeiture.  Because of its procedural advantages, and 
because direct foreclosure had obvious economic attractions to lenders, 
mortgages of this form appear to have been common, and the practice 
persisted to the promulgation of the January 17 regulation, through the first 
steps toward title registration in 1880, and beyond.65 
II. PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY DISSUADED 
MEIJI COURTS FROM POLICING THE TERMS OF JŌTO TANPO 
TRANSACTIONS 
Simplicity and certainty of enforcement were important attractions of 
“title-transfer security”;66 although in its simplest form, as a sale coupled 
                                           
60 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165. 
61 See id. 
62
 See id. 
63
 See generally Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38 (relating in 
detail difficulties at the prefectural level in implementing early rules on mortgage transactions). 
64
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 173-77; id. at 187 (citing relevant cases). 
65
 See id. at 169-71.  Registration of real estate was introduced by degrees, beginning with a simple 
transaction record at the local level.  See Tochi baibai jōto kisoku [Land Sale and Transfer Regulation], 
Dajōkan Public Order No. 52 of 1880, § 1; Tōki hō [Registration Act], Law No. 1 of 1886; Tochi daichō 
kisoku [Land Register Regulation], Imperial Edict No. 39 of 1889; Fudōsan tōki hō [Real Estate 
Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899. 
66
 TSUBAKI TOSHIO, DAIBUTSU BENSAI YOYAKU NO KENKYŪ 314 (1975) (relating a jesting exchange 
around the table at a meeting of the Hōsei shingikai [Judicial Reform Committee] that Osaka saw more 
cases of jōto tanpo than Tokyo because “persons of bad character”—persons more aggressive about 
collections—were more plentiful in the Kansai area; and also indicating the obligation of registry officials 
472 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 3 
 
with a conditional reconveyance, such a transaction exposes the debtor to a 
risk of loss disproportionate to the value of the underlying loan.  For 
transactions entered into before the promulgation of the Civil Code, courts 
routinely invalidated such sales for failing to comply with the formalities 
required to form a security interest.67  The complete invalidation of one 
party’s interest in an intended security arrangement is a fairly drastic 
instrument of judicial discipline.  A hint of its likely cause may be gleaned 
from the respective histories of Japanese and English property law. 
A. The English Mortgage Also Began As a Simple Transfer of Bare Title 
By Way of Security 
In American legal discourse today, the term “forfeiture” embodies two 
distinct concepts:  1) a (relatively) expeditious enforcement procedure; and 
2) a creditor’s right to seize collateral of greater value than the outstanding 
obligation. 68   Their conflation reflects the fact that the English law of 
mortgage, as originally fashioned in the seventeenth century, operated—like 
jōto tanpo—by manipulating the core concept of title itself.69  In common 
law jurisdictions, the extended foreclosure proceeding, which recognizes a 
lingering equity of redemption beyond the compulsory disposition of the 
debtor’s paper title, is the procedural means of assuring that conclusive title 
cannot move without giving the debtor an opportunity to salvage his 
remaining interest in the collateral.  Although this ultimate objective is 
straightforward,70 treating title itself as the foundation of the secured claim 
has forced common law legal doctrine through some severe contortions.  As 
Sir Frederick Pollock wrote in 1883: 
The power and practice of making a debtor’s property, and 
especially immovable property, a security to the creditor for the 
payment of his debt, are well-nigh as old as the legal 
recognition and enforcement of any rights of property 
                                                                                                                              
to accept applications for transfers of ownership based on valid documentation, whatever the intention of 
the parties might be). 
67
  See, e.g., Abe v. Memezawa, 7 DAIHAN MINROKU 65 (Issue 11) (Grand Ct. Jud., Dec. 20, 1901); 
Shime v. Hayada, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU 1232 (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 10, 1906); Takejima v. Takejima, 17 
DAIHAN MINROKU 205 (Grand Ct. Jud., Apr. 11, 1911); Sakuma v. Saitō, 17 DAIHAN MINROKU 221 (Grand 
Ct. Jud., Apr. 15, 1911). 
68
 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 1113; Marshall Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: 
Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599, 606 (1999).  In this Article, the term 
“forfeiture” is used in the latter sense, unless otherwise indicated. 
69
 POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 133-34. 
70 Thornborough v. Baker (1675) 3 Swanst. 628, 630, cited in W. HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 663 (1924) (“In natural justice and equity the principal right of the mortgagee is to the 
money, and his right to the land is only as a security for the money,” per Lord Nottingham). 
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whatever . . . . The forms, however, in which English law has 
given effect to this all but universal practice have been 
singularly ill chosen.71 
Built on civil law foundations, Japanese law was initially well 
positioned to avoid such difficulties.  In the earliest appellate judgments of 
the Great Court of Judicature72 involving pre-Code transactions, the Court 
repeatedly struck down “title-transfer security” agreements as based on a 
misrepresentation of intent on the register. 73   This position changed 
dramatically when the Court came to consider transactions governed by the 
Civil Code, resulting in a doctrinal cocktail that can fairly be described as 
novel, both from a comparative perspective and for Japan at that time. 
B. Drafters of the Civil Code Favored Recognition of Agreements for 
Abandonment of the Debtor’s Equity upon Default 
In contrast to English law, and in keeping with its civil law 
foundations, the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 provided a single, special-
purpose security interest for real estate:  the hypothec.74  This interest is a 
simple registered lien which entitles the secured party to initiate a judicial 
auction of the target property upon default, and to satisfy its claim out of the 
proceeds of sale.75  Technically, the creditor’s remedy is not limited to this 
procedure.  In contrast to the French-influenced rules of Japan’s first 
generation property system,76 and following the contemporary fashion for 
laissez-faire economics and freedom of contract,77 the Code also permitted 
parties to agree that the debtor’s entire interest should be forfeited upon 
                                           
71 POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 132-33. 
72
 Established in 1875, the Daishin’in became the highest national court of appellate jurisdiction 
upon the establishment of the unified national judiciary in 1890.  Ministry of Justice, Public Order No. 4 of 
1875; Saibansho kōsei hō [Courts Establishment Act], Law No. 6 of 1890. 
73
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 187. 
74 See MINPŌ arts. 369-98 (1898).  Note that the term translated here as “hypothec” (teitōken) has 
been rendered in various forms in English translations of Japanese laws over the years.  Naming 
conventions aside, the author hopes to gain the reader’s indulgence with the observation that “hypothec” 
here refers to a registered claim that permits its holder, following appropriate attachment proceedings, to a 
priority share in the proceeds of a judicial auction. 
75
 See MINPŌ arts. 369, 387. 
76
  See Takayanagi Kenzō, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, 
in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 15, 27-28 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 
1963). 
77
  See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776).  An abridged translation of The Wealth of Nations was published as early as 1881.  The full work 
became available in Japanese between 1883 and 1888.  Cf. ADAM SMITH, HŌKOKU FUKOKURON [THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS] (Kurashin-mura, Shizuoka Prefecture, Okada Ryōichirō trans., 1881); ADAM SMITH, 
HŌKOKU FUKOKURON [THE WEALTH OF NATIONS] (Keizaizasshisha, Tokyo, Ishikawa Eisaku et al. trans., 
1883-88). 
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default. 78   There was (and is) a single catch:  such a contract is not 
registrable and, as a result, cannot be set up against attachment creditors and 
other third parties.79  This practical restriction on forfeiture clauses would 
soon be subjected to collateral attack, via the interest that is the subject of 
this Article.  
While the Civil Code was under consideration in the National Diet, 
the desirability of allowing forfeiture clauses in pledge transactions (where 
the creditor takes physical possession of the collateral) was called into 
question.  Legislators inserted a provision at Section 349 restricting the 
claim of a pledge holder (such a pawnbroker) to the amount due on the 
underlying obligation.80  In commentaries published after promulgation of 
the Code, two of the Civil Code drafters attacked this amendment, 
characterizing it as a “wasteful measure” restraining freedom of contract.81  
Raising the specter of tight credit and economic stagnation, the drafters 
forcefully argued that, in any case, a “title-transfer security” agreement 
differed from a pledge, and so should not be held subject to this restriction, 
whatever the target collateral might be.82 
This introduction of “title-transfer security” as a gloss on the Civil 
Code opened a path to contracts for forfeiture, despite the absence of 
corresponding enforcement procedures tailored to the needs of such a 
lending transaction.  As will become clear in the discussion below, this 
procedural shortcoming gave rise to difficulties, as courts attempted to refine 
their disposition of secured claims over the course of time.  In fact, very 
similar problems were confronted by the English courts as early as the late 
seventeenth century.83  The classic English foreclosure proceeding is a useful 
point of comparison to highlight the issues raised by “title-transfer security” 
under the Japanese Civil Code. 
                                           
78
 See, e.g., Hashimoto v. Saitō, 14 DAIHAN MINROKU 313 (Grand Ct. Jud, Mar. 20, 1908) (holding 
that, under the Civil Code, a hypothec may provide for forfeiture of the collateral in the event of default); 
see also Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 180, 184 n.8. 
79
 See MINPŌ art. 369 (stating that a hypothec is a non-possessory means of security for a specific 
debt owed); Fudōsan tōki hō [Real Estate Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899, arts. 1, 117 (listing 
registrable interests and the registrable elements of a hypothec, respectively). 
80
 See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 179-80, 187-89. 
81
 See UME KENJIRŌ, MINPŌ YŌGI SONO NI BUKKEN HEN [ESSENTIAL CIVIL CODE, PART 2: RIGHTS IN 
REM] 404-08 (1896); TOMII MASAAKI, MINPŌ GENRON DAI NI KAN BUKKEN [PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL 
CODE, VOL. 2: RIGHTS IN REM] 483-85 (1914). 
82
 Id. 
83
 See POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 132-35. 
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C. A Judicial Foreclosure Proceeding Opens an Opportunity to Impose 
Mandatory Rules On an Otherwise Purely Contractual Relationship 
By the nineteenth century, a typical English mortgage was drafted as a 
transfer of the borrower’s ownership interest to the lender, conditioned on 
the repayment of the loan within a very short period.84  When (as expected) 
the borrower did not repay on the date specified (the “law day”), the lender 
acquired a legal right to eject the borrower and enter into immediate 
possession.85  He was restrained from doing so, however, by severe duties to 
care for the property and account to the debtor, and by the debtor’s “equity 
of redemption,” under which he could reclaim the property from the lender 
by paying the sums due under the loan.86  Critically, the debtor’s right of 
redemption could not be defeated by selling the property to a third party.87  A 
procedure was available for foreclosing the debtor’s interest, but this was 
purposefully structured to be time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain.88 
Because the English mortgage was essentially a special form of 
contract, it was open to lenders to attempt evasion of procedural barriers to 
forfeiture through creative drafting.  Courts responded by declaring that 
“clogs and fetters” on the equity of redemption were not to be tolerated.89  
Under the maxim “once a mortgage, always a mortgage,” the Court of 
Chancery came to apply the above procedures to any agreement that 
functioned as security for debt, regardless of its form. 90   To avoid the 
bilateral monopoly into which this tangled web of legal restrictions would 
otherwise force them, lenders developed the practice of including in their 
contracts a provision for sale of the property on default, satisfaction of the 
debt out of the proceeds, and restoration of the residue to the debtor.91  
Lenders were induced to be chary of the debtor’s interest because the law 
had made it procedurally costly to do otherwise. 
                                           
84 Id. at 134 (“The terms of the transaction were—as they still appear to be—that the debtor must pay 
his money to get back the land . . . at a stated time, generally six months after the date of the agreement, or 
it would become the creditor’s absolute property.”). 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. at 134-35. 
87 
 Id. 
88 
 Id. at 135. 
89
 See, e.g., Howard v. Harris, (1683) Eng. Rep. 609, [1558-1774] All. E.R. 609 (Lord Keeper’s 
Court); Santley v. Wilde, [1895-1899] All. E.R. 1338, 2 Ch. 747 (A.C.) (1899); see also Tracht, supra note 
68, at 600. 
90
 See, e.g., Seton v. Slade, (1802) Eng. Rep. 163, [1775-1802] All. E.R. 163 (Lord Chancellor’s 
Court). 
91
 POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 135. 
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D. Trust Concepts Enabled Meiji Courts to Embrace Contractualism and 
Avoid the Need to Evaluate Security Agreements 
Such elaborate judicial protections did not exist in the Meiji era’s 
youthful property system and, as a result, the procedural landscape under the 
Civil Code was slanted in precisely the opposite direction.  The Code 
provided a standard, registrable security interest in land, as a hypothec, or 
teitō-ken.92  The procedure for enforcing such a claim upon default required 
a judicially mandated sale of the property, conducted by licensed officers 
operating on a contract basis outside the premises of the court.93  The slack 
in this added layer of procedure, together with exceptional protections for 
certain short-term leases, 94  exposed the sale process to corruption and 
obstructive behavior that undermined the value of the security.  These risks 
could be circumvented through crude eviction proceedings pursuant to “title-
transfer security,” with the added benefit of a possible windfall at the 
expense of the unfortunate borrower’s general creditors. 95   As a result, 
judicial risks notwithstanding, it is not surprising that lenders persisted in 
extracting “title-transfer security,” whether as a primary form of collateral or 
as a backup to a mainstream hypothec interest. 
Returning to the speculative question posed earlier: why, in the pre-
Code period, did the Great Court of Judicature not do what the English 
courts had done, and simply impose the same standard procedure on all 
agreements, rather than invalidating “title transfer security” transactions 
entirely?  The reason may lie in the differing procedural contexts within 
which the respective court systems confronted this problem.  The maxim 
“once a mortgage, always a mortgage” emerged in English jurisprudence 
long before the eventual introduction of registered title in the twentieth 
century.96  Until that time, the entire substance of interests asserted by the 
parties was contained in privately drafted documents.97  The Meiji courts 
showed themselves to be perfectly capable of imposing judicial readings on 
                                           
92 See MINPŌ arts. 369-98. 
93
 See Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Civil Excecution in Japan: The Legal Economics of Perfect Honesty, 
177 HŌSEI RONSHŪ 1, 4-10 (1999) [hereinafter Bennett, Civil Execution] (concerning the history and status 
of the current bailiff system in Japan). 
94
 See generally Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Clash of the Titles: Japan’s Secured Lenders Meet Civil Code 
Section 395, 38 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 281 (1991) [hereinafter Bennett, Clash of Titles]. 
95
 Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 170. 
96
 Seton v. Slade, (1802) Eng. Rep. 163, [1775-1802] All E.R. 163 (Lord Chancellor’s Court) (U.K.); 
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (U.K). 
97
 See TIM MURPHY, SIMON ROBERTS & TATIANA FLESSAS, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 203-
04 (4th ed. 2004). 
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private contracts. 98   However, the decisions on “title-transfer security” 
referred to above arose after the introduction of formal title registration in 
188699 and, as such, were based on registered transfers of title.  To recast 
these transactions in an entirely different form would have required 
retroactive rectification of statements on the registers.  Without authority to 
issue such an order, the scope for judicial innovation in the Japanese context 
was thus severely compartmentalized, with the result that judges in these 
early cases were constrained to declare winners and losers, without 
attempting to craft alternative remedies. 
Whatever chilling effect early judgments might have had on attempts 
at forfeiture in commercial practice, there was a thaw after the promulgation 
of the Civil Code.  In 1902 and 1906, the Court handed down successive 
judgments upholding “title-transfer security”; and the 1906 decision was the 
first recorded judgment to involve movable property.100 
In later cases, German trust concepts were drawn upon to support this 
result with the elegance of theory.101  Introduced into Japanese academic 
discourse by Professor Okamatsu Santarō in an article published in 1902,102 
trust concepts from contemporary German legal doctrine attracted gathering 
interest until 1911 when, with nearly a single voice, the courts began 
referring to “title-transfer security” as a “declaration of trust” (shintaku 
kōi).103  Adding an implied trust layer to the analysis permitted a distinction 
to be made between “inner relations” (i.e., as between the parties) and “outer 
relations” (i.e., vis-á-vis third parties).104  This served as a doctrinal work-
around against the lurking objection that such transactions constituted a 
“false declaration of intention” (kyogi no ishi hyōji) under Section 94 of the 
Civil Code.105  Into the bargain, it gave judges a degree of freedom within 
                                           
98
 See, e.g., Hozumi Tadao, Hōritsu kōi no “kaishaku” no kōzō to kinō (II), 78 HŌGAKU KYŌKAI 
ZASSHI 27-71 (1961), translated in The Structure and Function of the “Intepretation” of Juristic Acts, Part 
II, 5 L. JAPAN 132 (John O. Haley trans., 1972). 
99
  See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 169-71; see also Tochi baibai jōto kisoku [Land Sale and 
Transfer Regulation], Dajōkan Public Order No. 52 of 1880, sec. 1; Tōki hō [Registration Act], Law No. 1 
of 1886; Tochi daichō kisoku [Land Register Regulation], Imperial Edict No. 39 of 1889; Fudōsan tōki hō 
[Real Estate Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899. 
100
 See, e.g., Uriwatashi teitō no hōritsu kankei, 91 HŌRITSU SHINBUN 16, 16 (June 16, 1902) 
(reporting the case of Andō v. Sano, Grand Ct. Jud. May 24, 1902); Jōno v. Higashi, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU 
1172. (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 5, 1906). 
101
  See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 126. 
102
 Okamatsu Santarō, Shintaku kōi no kōryoku ni kansuru gakusetsu o hihyōsu [Critical Appraisal of 
Academic Theory on the Effect of a Declaration of Trust], NAI-GAI RONSŌ, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-4 (1902). 
103
 See Ōmi Kōji, Jōto tanpo rironshi (1) [History of jōto tanpo Theory, Part 1], 63 WASEDA HŌGAKU 
35, 45 (1987) (Issue 1). 
104
 See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 128, 136-37. 
105
 MINPŌ art. 94.  Article 94 provides as follows: (1) A false declaration of intention made to the 
other party is ineffective . . . (2) The ineffectiveness of a declaration of intention, as referred to in the 
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the “inner relations” zone to discipline overreaching by the lender in pre-
Code contracts, to which restrictions on forfeiture still arguably applied.106  
With this doctrinal framework in place, “title-transfer security” became 
recognizable in its modern form, which we may henceforth refer to by its 
proper name of jōto tanpo.107 
In the course of the century that separates the present day from the 
early jōto tanpo decisions, the initial thin trust framework has been 
superseded by numerous theories attempting to clarify and regulate this 
device. 108   For better or for worse, however, the essentials remain 
unchanged.  The law governing these transactions continues to subsist as a 
judicial construct beyond the four corners of the Civil Code; the risk of 
forfeiture has been reduced but not eliminated; and jōto tanpo continues to 
be thought of and explained in trust-like terms—thereby separating this field 
of judge-made law from a Civil Code that would reject it entire, as based on 
a false declaration of intention.109 
E. Enforcement of Mainstream Security Interests Was Problematic 
through Most of Japan’s Period of High Growth 
The value of security naturally depends on the ease and certainty with 
which it can be realized by the creditor110 and, as noted above, one of the 
important initial incentives for using jōto tanpo against real property was the 
relative ease with which it could be enforced.  The civil execution 
procedures that Japan carried into the period of rapid growth in the 1960s 
and 1970s had a number of flaws111 that affected both lender strategies and 
the development of case law,112 including the law of jōto tanpo.  A review of 
policy-driven changes made to the law since that time helps reveal the depth 
of the problems, and why jōto tanpo and other non-Code interests were 
pursued vigorously in business circles during that period. 
                                                                                                                              
subsection above, cannot be asserted against a third party.  Id. (author’s translation); see also TADAKA 
HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 122-24,126-27, 154-55. 
106
  Abe v. Memezawa, 7 DAIHAN MINROKU 65 (Issue 11) (Grand Ct. Jud., Dec. 20, 1901); Shime v. 
Hayada, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU 1232 (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 10, 1906); Takejima v. Takejima, 17 DAIHAN 
MINROKU 205 (Grand Ct. Jud., Apr. 11, 1911); Sakuma v. Saitō, 17 DAIHAN MINROKU 221 (Grand Ct. Jud., 
Apr. 15, 1911). 
107
  SHIN HŌRITSUGAKU JITEN [NEW LEGAL DICTIONARY] 733 (3d ed. 1989). 
108
 TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 120-60. 
109
 Id.; MINPŌ art. 94. 
110
 Kondo Takao, Keibai fudōsan no baikyakuritsu ni tsuite [Concerning the Rate of Successful Sales 
in Real Estate Auctions], 38 JIYŪ TO SEIGI 77, 77 (Issue 13) (1987). 
111
 See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94, at 295; Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93, at 18-
27. 
112
 Haley, supra note 5, at 137-38. 
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To begin with, then as now, the only compulsory remedy available 
under a standard Civil Code hypothec was a judicial sale, managed by a 
licensed bailiff.113  Originally, most such sales were conducted as face-to-
face auctions, and until 1966, baliffs operated from their own offices, 
separate from the court.  This situation fostered collusion between bidders 
and the corruption of auction officials, reducing the value of the hypothec 
interest.114  In 1966, a reform measure raised the qualifications for newly 
appointed bailiffs, elevated their status by making them public officers, and 
placed them inside the premises of the court, thus providing for closer 
supervision.115 
There were further opportunities for entrepreneurial obstructionism, 
however.  The holder of a hypothec has a priority lien in the collateral, but 
does not have a right to vacant possession of the property; in principle, any 
action for eviction must be carried out by the purchaser. 116   In Japan, 
buildings and land are treated as separate items of property. 117   A late-
coming lender can conspire with the debtor to exploit this awkward 
fragmentation of ownership, by permitting the lender to construct a minimal 
structure on hypothecated land, in exchange for a final desperate advance.118  
Because the building is a discrete, registrable item of immovable property, 
this introduces an additional layer of issues that must be addressed in 
litigation. 119   Taken together, these two factors (sale with occupants in 
                                           
113
 See supra Part II(B). 
114
 SHIKKŌRI SEIDO KAIZEN IN KANSURU IKENSHŪ 85 (Ministry of Justice 1955) (response of Meiji 
University Faculty of Law, referring to the impact of “unsavoury individuals” on the civil execution 
process); SHIHŌ KENSHŪJŌ [LEGAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE], CHŌSA SŌSHO [INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORT SERIES] NO. 7, SHIKKŌ HŌ NI KANSURU SHOMONDAI [ISSUES IN THE LAW OF CIVIL EXECUTION] 
319-22 (1961) (discussing the merits and demerits of clearance prices as a means of obtaining better results 
from judicial auctions, and making the point that “when ordinary bidders freely participate in an auction, 
and it emerges that no bids have been made, this indicates that the auction property is not attractive to 
bidders at the stated clearance price, and it is sufficient to set a new auction date and to lower the price.  
But when the auction proceedings are controlled by one segment of ‘brokers’ who are intentionally 
obstructing their progress, and a new auction is inappropriately forced due to a lack of bids, adopting the 
normal practice of lowering the auction price will only result in delay of the auction proceedings and 
artificially depress the auction price.”); see generally Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93 (providing an 
account of the background to the 1966 reform of the bailiff system). 
115
 See Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93.  In a related reform, in 1979, the Civil Execution Act 
was amended to promote auction by sealed bids submitted by post.  See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 
94, at 295; Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 64. 
116
 See Binyū v. Kokumin kin’yū kōko, 53 MINSHŪ 1899 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Nov. 24, 1999). 
117
 See Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Building Ownership in Modern Japanese Law: Origins of the Immobile 
Home, 26 L. JAPAN 75, 75 (2000) [hereinafter Bennett, Building Ownership]. 
118
 See, e.g., Ōsenchikku K.K. v. Goyō kensetsu K.K., 59 MINSHŪ 356 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 
Mar. 10, 2005). 
119
 See, e.g., MINPŌ arts. 388 & 389 (providing for the disposition of an unencumbered building 
standing on hypothecated land subjected to auction proceedings, where the building was constructed before 
and after the attachment of the hypothec respectively); Tōyō bussan K.K. v. Fukutoku Ginkō K.K., 48 
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possession and the separate ownership of buildings) can give rise to adverse 
selection problems (because of the possibility that such a claim might exist), 
depressing the purchase price of all properties.120  A 1979 reform sought to 
limit the damage caused by this and other forms of guerrilla security by 
providing the result of an onsite bailiff’s inspection to bidders.121 
Another difficulty arose from the special treatment of certain leases.  
Until 2003, Civil Code section 395 gave short-term leasees a super-priority 
over pre-existing hypothecs.122  This legal toehold could be used by a late-
coming lender to stall proceedings for the realization of collateral, with a 
view to negotiating a settlement with the first-priority secured party. 123  
Obstructive leases of this kind, in contrast to ordinary leases for occupation, 
were invariably registered against the land or building to which they 
applied. 124   Registration of a lease requires the specific consent of the 
property owner,125 and a solvent property owner bargaining at arm’s length 
will not ordinarily permit registration.126  When a lease is used to obstruct 
the realization of collateral, however, the owner has no real stake in the 
property, and registration provides documentary proof to the lessee in his 
                                                                                                                              
MINSHŪ 1005 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, May 12, 1994) (concerning an eviction proceeding against an 
illegal structure standing on hypothecated land).  The impact of the separate settlement of land and building 
ownership interests extends beyond the field of secured claims.  See, e.g., Risai toshi shakuchi shakuya rinji 
shori hō [Land Lease and Building Lease Urban Disaster Interim Response Act], Law No. 13 of 1946 
(including the establishment of special framework procedures to encourage and support bargaining between 
landowners and the owners of buildings destroyed by natural disasters and other causes of mass 
destruction).  This feature of the Japanese property system may be characterized as an “anti-commons” as 
defined in Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
120
  See generally George Ackerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing an account of adverse selection behavior in markets 
characterized by asymmetric information). 
121
 Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 57; see Bennett, Clash of Titles, 
supra note 94, at 295, 301-04. 
122
 MINPŌ arts. 395, 602, as revised by Tanpo bukken oyobi minji shikkō seido no kaizen no tame no 
minpōtō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Amend the Civil Code and Other Laws for the 
Purpose of Improving Secured Claims and Civil Enforcement], Law No. 156 of 2003, art. 1 [hereinafter 
Civil Code Leases Revision] (before amendment, leases of up to 3 years with respect to a building, and 5 
years with respect to land, were protected against a subsequently registered hypothec for the remaining 
term of the lease). 
123
 See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94, at 288-92. 
124
 Watahiki Mariko, “Keibaiya”, “sen’yūya”, taiji wa seikō shita ka? [Has the Extermination of the 
“Auction Racketeer” and “Occupation Racketeer” Pests Been Successful?], 927 JURISUTO 64, 64-65 
(1989). 
125
 Nakao v. Shioda, 27 DAIHAN MINROKU 1378 (Grand Ct. Jud., July 11, 1921). 
126
 Note that land lease interests are an exceptional case, because they are logically necessary to 
support the separate ownership of buildings, a peculiar feature of the Japanese property system.  See infra 
notes 119-120 and accompanying text; see generally Bennett, Building Ownership, supra note 117 
(providing an account of the historical development of separate ownership of buildings under Japanese law 
and of the role played by leases in that context).  
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challenge to the rights of the secured party.127  Registered Section 395 leases 
have been used as a legal strategy for obstructing the realization of collateral 
since the inception of the Civil Code.128 
Opportunistic use of short-term leases became a significant issue for 
the finance community during Japan’s recent period of rapid growth.129   But 
embedded as this protection was in the property provisions of the Civil 
Code, it took several decades for the courts to formulate a telling remedial 
response to the Section 395 super-priority.130   It was finally abolished by 
statute, in a revision to the Civil Code passed in 2003.131 
The availability of numerous ex post strategies for the frustration of 
enforcement efforts, particularly in the period before the Civil Execution Act 
of 1979, had a substantial impact on the value of collateral under a Civil 
Code hypothec. 132   During the period of rapid economic growth, this 
prompted transactional innovation by lenders seeking more reliable forms of 
security (a development reflected in contemporary scholarship).133  These 
efforts were met with judicial and legislative responses aimed at stabilizing 
the commercial environment, by curbing creditor opportunism—specifically 
contractual forfeiture—in the real estate sector.134   But the first type of 
transaction to go through this cycle of innovation and reform, discussed 
below, was driven by frustration over the terms of the Civil Code property 
rules themselves, quite apart from difficulties in enforcement. 
                                           
127
  Watahiki Mariko, supra note 124, at 64. 
128
 See UCHIDA TAKESHI, TEITŌKEN TO RIYŌKEN [HYPOTHECS AND THE RIGHT OF USE] 108-10 
(1983). 
129
 See generally Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94 (providing an account of the abusive use of 
Section 395, and of judicial and legislative efforts to control it).  Cf. UCHIDA TAKESHI, supra note 128 
(providing Uchida Takeshi’s published doctoral thesis). 
130
 Binyū v. Kokumin kin’yū kōko, 53 MINSHŪ 1899 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Nov. 24, 1999) (in a 
case of illegal occupation under an invalid lease, holding that a hypothecated lender may sue in his own 
name and interest, in advance of judicial sale, for the eviction of persons who are in occupation for the 
purpose of obstructing the realization of security). 
131
 Civil Code Leases Revision, supra note 122, art. 1. 
132
 See Watahiki Mariko, supra note 124. 
133
 See, e.g., TSUBAKI TOSHIO, supra note 66; YONEKURA AKIRA, JŌTO TANPO NO KENKYŪ [A STUDY 
OF JŌTO TANPO] (1976); YONEKURA AKIRA, JŌTO TANPO (1978); YOSHIDA MASAMI, JŌTO TANPO (1979). 
134
 See Takuchi tatemono torihikigyō hō [Real Estate Brokerage Act], Law No. 176 of 1952, art. 
43(2) (prohibiting licensed real estate brokers from taking ownership as security where more than 30% of 
the purchase price has been paid). 
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III. INNOVATIVE REVOLVING CREDIT TRANSACTIONS CHALLENGED THE 
DEBTOR’S EQUITY BY AVOIDING MAINSTREAM ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEDURES FOR SECURED CLAIMS 
As originally drafted, the Civil Code provides a single non-possessory 
security interest applicable to real estate, in the form of the hypothec, 
defined in Sections 369 through 398.135  This interest is intended to support a 
single advance of funds and cover the principle outstanding plus a maximum 
of two years’ accrued interest; it cannot be used to cover future advances to 
the debtor. 136   Accordingly, the hypothec is unsuitable for backing a 
revolving credit arrangement, in which the creditor makes periodic advances 
to the borrower under a series of promissory notes.  To fill this common 
need, the commercial community resorted to a complex transaction, the 
name of which translates literally as provisional registration of a 
“preliminary contract for substitute performance subject to a suspensive 
condition.”137  As this name may suggest to those trained in the common 
law, it is an attempt to fashion something resembling a defeasible fee, using 
the Japanese property registers and contract provisions of the Civil Code as 
raw materials.138  Because of this similarity in conceptual structure, this 
interest will be referred to in the discussion below as a “mortgage by 
registration.” 
The mechanics of a typical transaction of this kind operated roughly 
as follows.  In support of the loan agreement, the debtor put his seal to a 
contract for the conveyance of real estate to the creditor, with a provision 
that the conveyance would become final upon the failure of the debtor to pay 
sums due to the creditor.  Together with other documents required to 
complete a transfer of ownership, this contract of conveyance was used as 
the basis for a “provisional registration” (kari tōki) on the property register.  
The debtor retained ownership of the property, but the creditor’s claim was 
now protected against subsequent interests that might attach to it.  In the 
event of default, the creditor filed suit to establish the fact of nonpayment 
and obtained an attachment order, which he could then use to convert the 
“provisional registration” to a final registration, establishing full 
ownership.139 
                                           
135
 MINPŌ arts. 369-398. 
136
 MINPŌ arts. 369, 375; see COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT, supra note 28. 
137
 Haley, supra note 5, at 133 (providing translation). 
138
  See generally Haley, supra note 5 (providing an account of the preliminary contract for substitute 
performance subject to a suspensive condition). 
139
 For a detailed description of the mechanics of the transaction, see id. at 138-39.  For the specific 
registration requirements, see SHIHŌ-SHOSHI SETSUREI & ZUKAISHIKI “MIRUDAKE” FUDŌSAN TŌKI 
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Like the jōto tanpo, the terms of a mortgage by registration were fixed 
by the contract between the parties and could thus be extended to cover 
multiple obligations arising over time, including notes acquired from other 
creditors.140  Recognition of these arrangements in the courts brought about a 
surge in their use.141  While this filled the immediate need for a means of 
securing revolving lines of credit, the structure of the mortgage by 
registration positively encouraged creditor overreaching. 
Because it took the form of a contract of sale, a mortgage by 
registration did not provide a means of stating the value to be secured on the 
register. 142   While the parties could in theory negotiate a formula for 
calculating the extent of the creditor’s claim (an anti-forfeiture clause) 
between themselves, in practice there was little incentive for them to do so.  
Negotiation over mortgage terms is premised on the risk of insolvency.  
Other potential lenders would normally assume that a mortgage by 
registration had no ceiling and contained no anti-forfeiture clause, because 
there was no systematic means of disclosing either.143  An anti-forfeiture 
clause (or even a ceiling on the extent of the security) would therefore have 
no value to the borrower as a means of reserving equity in the property to 
support advances by other lenders.  The sole benefit to the borrower of any 
such limitation (in this specific case of mortgages by registration) would be 
its value to himself in the event of his own insolvency—which would of 
course be zero, since the borrower would expect any remaining equity to be 
seized by attachment creditors in that event. 
Accordingly, borrowers beyond a certain risk threshold willingly 
signed on to revolving credit agreements that did not provide protection 
against forfeiture, and in a large number of transactions seen by the courts, 
the value of the collateral upon default significantly exceeded the amount 
owing to the secured creditor (i.e. the mortgagee by registration).144  In 
response, the courts adopted a policy of denying enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                              
SHOSHIKI-SHŪ (GE) [CONVEYANCING AGENT PRECEDENTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS “AT A GLANCE”, REAL 
ESTATE REGISTRATION FORMS (PART 2)] 440-442 (2007) [hereinafter CONVEYANCING FORMS]. 
140
 Suzuki Rokuya, Karitōki tanpo hō zakkō [Reflections on the Mortgage by Registration], 880 
KIN’YŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 29 (1979) (discussing the viability of rotating credit security arrangements cast as 
mortgages by registration following the passage of the Mortgages Act 1978). 
141
  TSUBAKI TOSHIO, supra note 66, at 326 (indicating that 22 cases involving mortgages by 
registration were decided by the courts between the first judgment characterizing the arrangement as a 
security interest, and the most recent data available to the author of the work at the time of writing, in 
1973—including 4 further decisions by the Supreme Court). 
142
 For sample register entries, see CONVEYANCING FORMS, supra note 139. 
143
  See generally Ackerloff, supra note 120 (providing an account of adverse selection behavior in 
markets characterized by asymmetric information). 
144
  See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 163-64. 
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creditor’s interest where the disparity between the debt owed and the value 
of the collateral was extreme, on the grounds of “public order and morality” 
(kō no chitsujo mata wa zenryo no fūzoku).145 
A. Legislation Sought to Impose Mainstream Enforcement Procedures on 
Revolving Credit Arrangements 
In an attempt to address these issues, the Diet intervened, adding an 
entire subsection to the Civil Code with specific provisions covering a new 
“root hypothec” interest. 146   This registrable interest provides umbrella 
security for miscellaneous obligations, including promissory notes and other 
rights to payment acquired by assignment, up to the point of an act of 
bankruptcy.147  To permit the borrower to signal the extent of the security to 
third parties, the maximum amount to be covered is specified at the time of 
registration.148  At the back end, the root hypothec interest relies on the same 
procedures for judicial auction and distribution of proceeds as the standard 
Civil Code hypothec.149 
This carefully crafted reform was enacted by the Diet in 1971,150 but it 
did not achieve the degree of adoption hoped for by its drafters; many 
businesses continued to use the mortgage by registration that the root 
hypothec was intended to replace.151  One reason for this was then-existing 
obstacles to the realization of hypothec claims. 152   Despite the risk of 
forfeiture, and apart from its utility in securing future advances, the 
mortgage by registration had significant advantages for borrowers.  
Compared with the standard Civil Code hypothec, it allowed borrowers to 
make a credible commitment not to obstruct collection efforts in the event of 
default; and as compared with jōto tanpo, it exposed the borrower to less 
risk during the term of the loan, because he retained legal title to the 
collateral until the instant of enforcement.  However, the forfeiture and 
                                           
145
 MINPŌ art. 90.  Article 90 provides as follows:  Legal acts for purposes that conflict with public 
order and morality are void.  Id. (author’s translation); see also TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 163-
64. 
146
 Minpō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Revise the Civil Code], Law No. 99 of 
1971. 
147
 MINPŌ art. 398-2. 
148
 Id. art 398-2, para. 1. 
149
 See MINPŌ arts. 369, 398-2; Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, arts. 43-
92, 181.   
150
 Minpō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Revise the Civil Code], Law No. 99 of 
1971. 
151
 See Suzuki Rokuya, supra note 140, at 30. 
152
 See Haley, supra note 5, at 138-39 (providing a contemporary description of obstacles to the 
realization of hypothecated collateral). 
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signaling problems were also inherent to its structure, and these were 
naturally unaffected by the 1971 legislation.153 
B. Opportunism Persisted, and Courts Strove to Protect the Debtor’s 
Equity Through Ground-Breaking Precedent 
In an effort to address the most glaring result of bargaining failure (i.e. 
mismatches between the value of collateral and the sums owed to the 
creditor), in 1967 the Supreme Court signaled approval of lower court 
efforts to restrict the forfeiture remedy, 154  leading to a later definitive 
judgment of the Grand Bench, handed down on October 23, 1974.155  The 
1974 decision outlined two alternative remedial tracks:  execution by sale 
and direct execution.  In execution by sale, the borrower’s right to redeem 
would be extinguished by sale to a third party, but he would then have 
recourse to the lender for a share of the proceeds.156  In direct execution, the 
borrower could withhold his consent to conversion on the register until the 
creditor offered up a reasonable accounting of the borrower’s equity.157  In 
the latter case only, the debtor’s right to recover his property was, as in 
English law, protected up to the instant of foreclosure by treating the 
accounting and the transfer of ownership as reciprocal, or “simultaneous,” 
obligations.158 
C. Non-Code Revolving Credit Arrangements Were Eliminated By Statute 
by Imposing a Special Judicial Foreclosure Proceeding 
The Supreme Court decision of 1967 established the borrower’s right 
to an accounting.  The Diet subsequently adopted and extended this judicial 
framework, with the passage of the Act Concerning Provisional Registration 
                                           
153
  In effect, the new legislation forced parties to choose one advantage (a bargained-for limitation on 
the extent of security) but abandon another (reliable enforcement procedures). 
154
 Decision of the Supreme Court, 21 MINSHŪ 2430, (First Petty Bench, Nov. 16, 1967).  The early 
phase of this series of cases was the subject of an article published by Professor Haley in 1972.  Haley, 
supra note 5 (providing an account of contemporary case law concerning the “preliminary contract for 
substitute performance subject to a suspensive condition”, or “mortgage by registration”, as it is referred to 
in the main text of this Article). 
 
155
 Mikami v. Kobayashi, 28 MINSHŪ 1473 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Oct. 23, 1974). 
156
 Id. at 1482. 
157
 Id. 
158
 Haley describes public auction as the favoured means of disposition.  Haley, supra note 5, at 145-
46.  While this was the case in 1972, the courts later concluded that direct foreclosure provided them with a 
better capacity to assure a fair accounting of the debtor’s interest.  See TAKAGI ET AL., MINPŌ KŌZA 3: 
TANPO BUKKEN [COURSE IN THE CIVIL CODE, VOLUME 3, SECURITY INTERESTS] 295-96 (revised ed. 1980).  
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Security Contracts in 1978 (“Mortgages Act 1978”).159  To assure that the 
borrower’s equity in the collateral is protected, the Act requires the lender to 
notify the debtor of his intention to foreclose, together with a statement of 
the proposed accounting, two months before converting his provisional 
registration of ownership to a main registration entry. 160   The right to 
foreclosure arises two months after this notice, 161  thereby providing the 
debtor with an opportunity to object and open negotiations if the proposed 
accounting amount is unacceptable.  The Act also introduces an explicit 
requirement that the mortgagee obtain the consent of holders of subordinate 
interests, if any, as a precondition of asserting a right to title.162  Without 
such consent, the mortgagee’s remedy is limited to a judicial auction and 
accounting. 
The Mortgages Act 1978 has virtually eliminated mortgages by 
registration from the transactional universe, largely because the legislation, 
in a parting shot at a recalcitrant industry, specifically excludes revolving 
credit arrangements from the scope of perfection. 163   Encumbered with 
additional procedural requirements, with significantly reduced flexibility, 
and stripped of the possibility of forfeiture, mortgage by registration lost its 
lustre.  Lenders turned either to one of the forms of hypothec defined in the 
Civil Code or to jōto tanpo, which was not affected by the restrictions 
imposed by this legislation. 
IV. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE DEBTOR’S EQUITY IN JŌTO TANPO 
TRANSACTION REMAINS PROBLEMATIC 
The jōto tanpo against real property is the oldest of Japan’s non-Code 
security interests.  It offers a simplified means of enforcing security, through 
a direct claim to title in the collateral.  It must be said that the scope for its 
use is narrower today than it once was.  As discussed above,164 since the 
introduction of the root hypothec, it has been possible to support revolving 
credit arrangements without resorting to non-Code security interests; and 
improvements to judicial auction procedures have increased the utility of the 
mainstream interests.  The Civil Code interests offer greater flexibility; 
                                           
159
 Kari-tōki tanpo keiyakutō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Provisional Registration Security 
Contracts], Law No. 78 of 1978 [hereinafter Mortgages Act 1978]. 
160
  Id. art. 2.  
161
 Proof of the notice and its content can be made by use of “contents proven post”, under which the 
Post Office retains a true copy of the correspondence, coupled with certified delivery.  See Yūbin hō [Postal 
Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, arts. 62 & 63. 
162
  Mortgages Act 1978, supra note 159, art. 4. 
163
 Id. art. 14.  See COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT, supra note 28, at 270. 
164
  See supra Part III. 
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because jōto tanpo operates against bare title (as a nominal transfer of 
ownership) the property must be free of other liens at the time of creation—a 
scenario uncommon among the failing debtors most likely to expose 
themselves to the risks associated with jōto tanpo.  Nonetheless, insofar as 
jōto tanpo remains a recognized security device, is found in commerce, and 
continues to generate litigation, it continues to absorb limited judicial 
resources, and remains a potential target for further statutory reform. 
As noted above, the foundation of security arrangements in common 
law jurisdictions originally lay in paper drafted by the parties.165  Bearing in 
mind the differing procedural contexts, comparison of holdings relating to 
jōto tanpo with judicial experience in common law jurisdictions can help 
both to highlight the constraints facing Japanese courts and to raise the 
possibility of an alternative approach to these transactions.  Below, 
following a brief overview of the modern rules relating to jōto tanpo in real 
property, this Article will discuss three Supreme Court cases relating, 
respectively, to third-party dispositions, mortgagees in possession, and an 
analogue to the common law “clogs and fetters” doctrine.166 
One procedural point that should be noted at the outset is that the 
“equity of redemption”167 does not exist (or at least has a very different 
meaning) in the Japanese context.  Properly speaking, the term signifies the 
postponement, by the court, of a valid transfer of title made with the 
intention of offering it as security.  This postponement is imposed by forcing 
all transactions that the court deems to constitute security arrangements 
(mortgages) through mandatory foreclosure proceedings.168  Courts in Japan 
do not have the power to impose a comprehensive procedure in this way.  As 
in other civil law jurisdictions, the remedies available for a given secured 
claim are attached to the specific formal character of the interest at stake.  In 
the case of attachment or the exercise of a hypothec, collateral is realized by 
judicial auction, 169 while in a case of illegal occupation, the owner’s remedy 
is an immediate action for eviction.170  For this reason, many of the familiar 
equitable pronouncements by common law courts in respect of the equity of 
                                           
165
 See MURPHY, ROBERTS & FLESSAS, supra note 97, at 203-04; see also note 97 and accompanying 
text. 
166
  See, e.g., Howard v. Harris, (1683) Eng. Rep. 609, [1558-1774] All. E.R. 609 (Lord Keeper’s 
Court); Santley v. Wilde, [1895-1899] All. E.R. 1338, 2 Ch. 747 (A.C.) (1899); see also Tracht, supra note 
68, at 600. 
167
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1990). 
168
 See, e.g., Stevens v. Theatres Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch. 857 (U.K). 
169
 Minji shikkō hō arts. 43-92. 
170
  Id. arts. 168-70. 
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redemption have no context in Japan.171  This procedural difference is an 
important factor in the use and impact of jōto tanpo and other non-Code 
interests within the transactional system. 
Under current law, the real property jōto tanpo transaction takes the 
same form that it did in 1899.  A promise to reconvey the property to the 
borrower upon repayment is recited as part of a contract of sale, and this is 
used as the basis for registering ownership in the lender.172  The contract of 
sale must indicate the “cause of registration” (tōki no gen’in), which must 
also be recited in the power of attorney offered by the owner.173  In an 
orthodox transaction negotiated at arm’s length, the cause of registration will 
be listed as “jōto tanpo.”174  The obligation to restore the property upon 
repayment is discoverable on the face of the register in this case, but there is 
no means of registering the specific terms of the reconveyance undertaking.  
The creditor becomes the legal owner, and the collateral is vulnerable both 
to third party claims arising from bankruptcy of the lender and to attachment 
proceedings against him.175  Upon default by the borrower, the lender is 
legally entitled to realize the collateral, either by claiming it directly or by 
selling to a third party.176 
Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1968 (foreclosure by sale 
contracts) and 1971 (direct foreclosure contracts) have established the well-
intentioned principle that the debtor in a jōto tanpo arrangement is entitled to 
demand an accounting from the creditor if the collateral is worth more than 
the amount in default.177  Depending on one’s favored legal theory, the jōto 
tanpo-secured lender might be said to hold title on trust,178 or subject to 
                                           
171
 See, e.g., Batty v Snook, 5 Mich 231, 239-240 (1858) (“The mortgagor may release equity of 
redemption to the mortgagee for a good and valuable consideration, when done voluntarily, and there is no 
fraud, and no undue influence brought to bear on him for that purpose by the creditor.  But it cannot be 
done by a contemporaneous or subsequent executory contract, by which the equity of redemption is to be 
forfeited if the mortgage debt is not paid on the day stated in the contract, without an abandonment by the 
court of those equitable principals it has ever acted on in relieving against penalties and forfeitures.”) 
172
  See FUDŌSAN TŌKI JITSUMU [REGISTRATION PRACTICE] 389-91 (3d ed., Ministry of Just. Civ. Div. 
ed., 1978). 
173
 See id. 
174
 There are cases in which the jōto tanpo is not visible on the register.  See, e.g., Imai v. Takechi, 48 
MINSHŪ 414 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994). 
175
 See, e.g., [name undisclosed] K.K. v. Seiri kaishū kikō K.K., 1225 HANREI TAIMUZU 187 (2007) 
(Sup. Ct., Second Petty Bench, Oct. 20, 2006). 
176
 The permissible means of realizing the collateral may be limited in the contract between the 
parties, although this does not affect the secured party’s legal power of disposition. 
177
 Izumi v. Kanai, 22 MINSHŪ 509 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 1968); Shinkai v. Takahashi, 25 
MINSHŪ 208 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 1971).  The accounting requirement replaced the previous rule, 
under which security agreements were voided entirely where the disparity between the value of the 
collateral and the debt owed was excessively great. 
178
 See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 126-32. 
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publicity,179 or as a façade,180 or in common with the debtor,181 or subject to 
the debtor’s expectation interest.182  Unfortunately, of course, none of these 
elaborate concepts are visible on the register; the secured party is shown 
simply as “owner” of the property.  If the creditor transfers his interest to a 
third party before settling accounts with the debtor, the practical question 
arises whether the debtor’s right to redeem can be asserted against a 
transferee taking with notice.  This is the subject of the following case. 
A. Imai v. Takechi: A Third-Party Purchaser from the Jōto Tanpo 
Mortgagee Takes Good Title Regardless of Notice, if the Transfer is 
Supported By Registration 
The case of Imai v. Takechi183 turns on a tangled and long-burning 
family dispute involving siblings and spouses of two sisters Imai.184  In 
1957, Takechi Kazuo, husband to Hanako (née Imai), borrowed 520,000 yen 
from Wada Tsuneo, the husband of Hanako’s younger sister.185  The loan was 
to be repaid in interest-free monthly installments of 5,000 yen over a period 
of eight years and seven months.186  The loan supported the purchase of land 
and a house, and Takechi secured his promise to repay by immediately 
transferring ownership of the property to Wada, with a reciprocal 
undertaking that ownership would be restored upon full repayment.187  This 
conveyance was duly registered, with “gift” as the cause of registration.188  
For reasons not given in the judgment, in May of 1963, eldest brother Imai 
Ken’ichiro and the mother of the Imai clan moved into the property with 
Takechi and Hanako.189  The two families did not get along.  Takechi moved 
out, ceasing payment on the loan from Wada (husband of Hanako’s younger 
sister), and leaving some 150,000 yen outstanding on the loan.190 
Over a decade later, in 1977, Takechi filed suit seeking the eviction of 
Imai Ken’ichiro from the property and restoration of ownership to his own 
name.191  The court refused to remove Wada Tsuneo’s ownership from the 
                                           
179
 See id. at 140-41 (citing the work of Ishida Bunjirō). 
180
 See id. at 141-42 (citing the work of Hamagami Norio). 
181
 See id. at 146 (citing the work of Suzuki Rokuya). 
182
 See id. at 146-47 (citing the work of Takeuchi Toshio). 
183
 Imai v. Takechi, 48 MINSHŪ 414 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994). 
184
 See id. at 421. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Id. at 421-22. 
188
 Id. at 422. 
189
 Id. at 423. 
190
 See id. at 435. 
191
 Id. at 424. 
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register, on the grounds that the original loan was still outstanding; 
nevertheless, the court acknowledged that Takechi was entitled to the 
eviction order as the equitable owner under a jōto tanpo.192  The court issued 
the order, removing Imai Ken’ichiro from the premises; Takechi resumed 
occupation.193  
Two more years passed, and on May 10, 1979, after Imai Ken’ichiro 
prevailed upon Wada Tsuneo for assistance against his other brother-in-law, 
the latter sent a notice to Takechi, by contents proven post,194 of his intention 
to settle accounts and foreclose Takechi’s interest in the property.195  The 
letter was returned undelivered, but on August 29, 1979, Wada Tsuneo 
proceeded to transfer his ownership interest in the house and land (still 
occupied by Takechi) to Imai Ken’ichiro.196  This transaction was entered on 
the register as a “gift” two days later.197  No accounting was made to Takechi 
following the transfer, but Takechi evidently caught wind of these 
machinations:  on August 20, 1981, he paid the arrears under the loan (which 
with statutory interest had more than doubled to a sum of 383,013 yen) into 
court escrow as his redemption payment.198  In response, Imai Ken’ichiro 
sued Takechi for eviction on the grounds that, as registered transferee, Imai 
Ken’ichiro had acquired ownership of the property free of Takechi’s right of 
redemption.199 
1. The Borrower, Not the Lender, is Vulnerable to Third Party Transfers 
in a Jōto Tanpo Relationship 
As the two acts of registration in this case illustrate, a jōto tanpo 
agreement conveys an alienable ownership interest to the lender.  It 
resembles an equitable mortgage in common law jurisdictions—but with the 
“equitable” and “legal” positions reversed.  Rather than an equitable right in 
the lender that may be vulnerable to third-party claims,200 under jōto tanpo it 
is the borrower who holds an uncertain, “equitable” claim for reconveyance.  
Modeling the jōto tanpo structure in these terms, the lender would be said to 
hold the legal estate in the land on trust for the borrower.  Upon disposition 
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by the trustee of the legal estate to a third party, the borrower, as beneficiary, 
would be entitled to defeat the third party’s title and exercise his right to 
redeem.201  Under equitable principles familiar in common law jurisdictions, 
purchasers for value without notice of the trust would be protected, but in 
this case, the plaintiff Imai Ken’ichiro took with notice (and was not a 
purchaser, to boot).202 
2. Foreclosure Proceedings and the Doctrine of Notice Are 
Complementary Instruments of Judicial Discipline 
Secured transactions of this precise form are not a feature of the 
English conveyancing environment.  However, prior to England’s Law of 
Property Act 1925, a similar posture could arise in the context of foreclosure 
proceedings.203  Stevens v. Theatres, Ltd.204 represents such a case.  Classic 
foreclosure proceeds in three phases:  1) the lender first petitions the court 
for foreclosure unless the borrower pays all sums due by a particular date; 2) 
if the borrower fails to pay, the court then issues an order of foreclosure nisi, 
which confirms the failure to pay and places the property under the court’s 
jurisdiction; and 3) if at the end of this interval (typically six months) 
payment is still not forthcoming, the mortgagee may obtain an order of 
foreclosure absolute, which in principle entirely severs the interest of the 
borrower.  As had become common practice by the time of the Stevens 
decision, the mortgage in that case gave the mortgagee an explicit, 
contractual power of sale.205  The sole issue in the case was whether, in the 
administrative interval between foreclosure nisi and foreclosure absolute,206 
the mortgagee had authority to sell the property without leave of the court.  
The court held that while the mortgagee had the legal power to dispose of 
the mortgage, this was subject to an equitable requirement to obtain leave of 
the court before sale.207  The conveyance was permitted to stand, on the 
condition that it be shown that the purchaser took without notice of the still-
pending foreclosure proceeding.208  Only when that was confirmed would 
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the purchaser receive good title, and the mortgagor a money claim against 
the mortgagee for any surplus.209 
3. The Supreme Court’s Holding: Registration Determines All 
If the doctrine of notice used in Stevens were applied to a case like 
Imai v. Takechi, the right to redemption enjoyed by the borrower (Takechi) 
would be protected against third parties taking with notice of the interest.  In 
the  event, however, the trial court judge ignored Imai’s evident knowledge 
of the unregistered security interest, reasoned that the attempted 
communication of May 10, 1979 was sufficient to cut off Takechi’s legal 
right to the property, and held for Imai. 210   The Takamatsu High Court 
applied the doctrine of notice and reversed, ordering that title be settled on 
Takechi.211  The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that Takechi’s claim 
to the property was conclusively severed when Imai Ken’ichiro took the 
transfer from Wada as registered owner, regardless of knowledge.212  This 
case firmly establishes that actual notice is irrelevant in a jōto tanpo 
transaction; the title of a third-party transferee, if taken in reliance on the 
register, is unassailable. 
The court gives two reasons for this judgment:  “Not only would a 
contrary holding destabilize the chain of title, but it would give rise to the 
risk that a creditor, who may not be in a position to identify a mala fide 
transferee with notice, will suffer an unforeseeable loss.”213  This holding 
has been the target of criticism.214  It is indeed difficult to see how limiting 
the right of redemption to third-party transferees with actual notice would 
unduly destabilize the chain of title, because such transferees can easily 
protect themselves by foregoing the purchase.  Furthermore, because the 
debtor’s challenge to the transfer is premised on the tender of monies due, 
the creditor would not be exposed to financial risk.  The required 
adjustments would, at worst, be an inconvenience to the creditor, but would 
also reduce the burden of litigation by eliminating the need for a second 
action—such as a suit by Takechi against Wada to recover the value of his 
equity in the property. 
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4. Protecting Registered Transfers by the Jōto Tanpo Mortgagee 
Increases the Risk of Creditor Opportunism 
Japan’s limited form of title registration provides a firmer justification 
for the rule in this case.  In jurisdictions such as Australia (since 1858),215 
Japan (since 1899),216 and England (since 1925),217 the equitable niceties of 
off-register transactions conflict with the objectives of registered title.218  
The guiding principles of such a system are commonly articulated to be 
three: 1) the mirror principle (entries on the register should provide a 
complete and correct view of legal interests); 2) the curtain principle 
(equitable interests should not affect the title acquired by the purchaser); and 
3) the insurance principle (the state guarantees the accuracy of the register 
to the purchaser).219 
These principles are aimed at lowering the cost of conveyancing, by 
allowing buyers to evaluate the title of real estate by simply examining the 
register.220  The Japanese registration system has all of these characteristics 
except for the third.  It is worth noting that the holding in Imai v. Takechi—
that title received from a registered owner is never affected by an off-register 
jōto tanpo interest—reduces the demand for insurance by making 
transactions safer for the purchaser.  It does so, however, only by shifting the 
risk to the borrower. 
In England, courts have refused to recognize the mortgage by deposit 
of title deeds against registered land, on the grounds that to do so would 
violate the mirror principle.221  This has effectively eliminated the equitable 
mortgage by deposit of title deeds from the registered conveyancing 
landscape in England and Wales. 222   In Japan’s jōto tanpo, as indicated 
above, the equitable and legal positions or borrower and secured party are 
reversed.  The result is that the same strict adherence to the register has an 
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opposite effect in Japan.223  The unrestricted power of sale sustains jōto 
tanpo as a viable non-Code, off-register security device, while the contrary 
rule (i.e. applying the doctrine of notice) would have marginally undermined 
the transaction, making the realization of collateral under jōto tanpo less 
certain.224 
Thus, both English and Japanese courts favor strict adherence to a 
bright-line rule with respect to “off-register” interests, but with opposite 
effect.  Due to differing commercial customs in the two jurisdictions, strict 
respect for the register in one case eliminates the off-register transaction, but 
in the other case it positively encourages it.  Unfortunately, this offers 
considerable scope for opportunism, as illustrated by the following case. 
B. Nakano v. Okamura:  The Mortgages Act 1978 Foreclosure Procedure 
is Not To Be Applied to Analogous Transactions 
On April 8, 1994, Nakano Kōju took a short-term loan in the amount 
of 33,000,000 yen from Okamura Shōhei.225  Their agreement provided for 
payment of interest at the rate of 2.5% per month, with a due date of June 7, 
1994, plus a penalty of 40.004% per year in the event of late payment.226  
The loan was secured by a root hypothec to the amount of 70,000,000 yen 
against land owned by Nakano, which Okamura duly registered.227  Nakano 
did not meet the contract deadline for repayment, but over time made 
payments totaling 4,856,000 yen, the last on January 31, 1995.228  At a 
meeting on May 2, 1995, Nakano implored Okamura not to initiate auction 
proceedings based on the hypothec.229  The two settled upon a forbearance 
until May 25, and Nakano provided Okamura with documents necessary to 
effect a transfer of the property into Okamura’s name on that date, with 
leave to sell to third parties, if timely payment was not made.230  Nakano 
again defaulted, and on May 26, Okamura registered the conveyance of the 
property, giving “substitute performance” as the cause of registration.231 
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After completing this transfer of legal ownership, Okamura again 
pressed Nakano for repayment of the loan, and on June 8, Okamura notified 
Nakano that he was willing to reconvey the property to him if payment were 
made by June 16.232  In exchange for this one-week postponement, Nakano 
put his seal to a declaration waiving his equity in the property in the event of 
further default.233  Nakano defaulted again, but made a partial payment of 
10,000,000 yen on September 15, which Okamura accepted.234 
On December 24, 1995, Okamura made a final demand:  payment of 
the total sum due under the loan (41,272,600 yen) by January 26, 1996, 
including a stipulation that the property would be immediately sold upon 
default.235  Nakano did not respond.  On July 19, 1996, Okamura sold the 
property to a third party, Sano Nobuichi, who promptly registered his 
interest.236  Having lost his property, Nakano sued to avoid both the original 
transfer to Okamura and the Okamura-Sano sale and, in the alternative, for 
100,000,000 yen as compensation for Nakano’s equitable interest in the 
property.237 
This case turns on the characterization of the conveyance that 
Okamura registered on May 26, 1995.  If the stated purpose for the 
registration of the transfer of title—“substitute performance”—is accepted, 
then the conveyance satisfied Nakano’s obligations under the loan, and 
Nakano had at that point surrendered all rights in the property.238  However, 
in the case, both parties subsequently behaved as if the loan obligation 
continued, and as if Okamura held title only as security.  If the Nakano-
Okamura transfer is treated as a jōto tanpo, the final sale to third party Sano 
is final, and Nakano’s only claim should be against Okamura for an 
accounting (assuming Nakano’s waiver of his equity to be invalid, as it 
appears to be).239 
1. The Mortgagor Sought to Impose Special Foreclosure Proceedings 
At trial, neither party characterized the transaction as jōto tanpo.  
Okamura relied on the documentation, claiming the original transfer was a 
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substitute performance for sums due.240  Nakano, for his part, argued that the 
documents for the original transfer, which were worded to take effect 
twenty-three days from the date of delivery, constituted a mortgage by 
registration (although it did not satisfy the formalities for that interest, and 
was not so registered).241  On the theory that the Mortgages Act 1978 should 
be applied to the transaction, Nakano petitioned to set aside the original 
transfer, because Okamura had not given formal notice of an intention to 
exercise his interest two months before it was registered as a final transfer, 
as required by Section 2 of that Act.242 
2. The Form of a Jōto Tanpo Transaction Invites Ex Post 
Characterization of Its Function 
The facts of this case illustrate the exotic attraction of jōto tanpo in 
real estate as a tool for collections.  In the interval between May 25 and 
September 15, 1995, the character of the transaction was truly ambiguous.  
Had Okamura sold the property during this period, evidence for treating the 
sale as a true substitute performance would be strong.  The subsequent 
tender by Nakano, and its acceptance by Okamura, implies on the contrary 
that the agreement is a security arrangement.  The potential for the lender in 
such an arrangement to play the market at the expense of the debtor is clear.  
The appeal to the Mortgages Act 1978 by Nakano’s counsel reflects a 
proposal by some scholars that it be used to instilling a greater degree of 
formal discipline on jōto tanpo transactions.243  Unfortunately, this would 
not resolve ambiguities in the contractual paper, which is the potential 
source of opportunism illustrated by this case. 
In the pleadings, it is difficult to be fully sympathetic toward the claim 
of either party.  Okamura’s claim is clearly disingenuous, given the clear 
evidence that he resumed collection efforts after the “transfer.”  For 
Nakano’s part, his attempt to avoid the two transfers of ownership registered 
in the wake of his default appears to have little more than nuisance value.  
The Civil Code hypothec securing the original loan was extinguished by 
merger when Okamura took title, but this would be revived if the transfers to 
Okamura and to Sano were found to be void.244  If the hypothec remains 
                                           
240
 Nakano v. Okamura, 1106 HANREI TAIMUZU 81, 84 (Jan. 15, 2003) (Sup. Ct. First Petty Bench, 
Sep. 12, 2002). 
241
 Id. 
242
 Id. 
243
  TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 313-15. 
244
 Id. at 85. 
AUGUST 2009 “INFORMAL” MORTGAGES IN THE JAPANESE COURTS 497 
  
valid, the primary effect of Nakano’s petition would be to inconvenience the 
third party purchaser Sano, by invalidating his title. 
The Tokyo High Court accepted Nakano’s position, and declared both 
transfers to be void.245  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.  Classifying 
the original transfer as a jōto tanpo, the Court declared the sale to Sano 
effective and final, and remanded the case for further hearings on the 
accounting of Nakano’s remaining equity interest, if any.246 
3. The Supreme Court Declined the Invitation to Impose Special 
Foreclosure Proceedings on Jōto Tanpo Transactions 
This precedent prevents either party from using the Court as a tool for 
inflicting gratuitous damage on the other.  On the other hand, the facts of this 
case do seem to invite the application of the Mortgages Act 1978 to jōto 
tanpo transactions.  This would resolve the problem, separate from the 
transactional ambiguity referred to above, of disconnect between the 
realization of the collateral and the accounting made of the debtor’s interest.  
Despite the impact on Sano, adopting this approach could have a beneficial 
impact.  As common law courts learned from long experience with 
unregistered mortgage practice, denying title to transferees is an effective 
means of chasing transactions under the protective umbrella of an orderly 
foreclosure procedure, where overreaching can be more effectively 
controlled.247  This is the aim of the analogous common law “clogs and 
fetters” doctrine, which imposes the formal foreclosure process on any 
transaction found to have the effect of creating a security interest in real 
estate.248  By refusing to apply the Mortgages Act 1978 by analogy even 
when no other viable option was contained in the pleadings, the Supreme 
Court pointedly closed the door on this pathway to a “clogs and fetters” 
doctrine based on existing procedural structures. 
As in the case of Imai v. Takechi, the Supreme Court judgment in 
Okamura v. Nakano reflects the Court’s recognition of the constraints of the 
registration system.  Holding jōto tanpo creditors to the procedural 
requirements of a statutory mortgage by registration would require 
abandonment of the curtain principle, a cost that the Court is unwilling to 
incur.  Given that imperative, and given the persistence of jōto tanpo 
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transactions in business custom, the scope for judicial control of creditor 
overreaching is limited. 
The third and final case discussed below concerns another distinctive 
feature of Japanese jōto tanpo doctrine:  the relationship between the parties 
after default, but in advance of an accounting or sale. 
C. Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate: Mortgagees in Possession Do Not Have 
an Obligation to Maximize the Value of the Mortgagor’s Interest 
The case of Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate arose during Japan’s “Bubble 
Economy,” the frenzied period of rapid asset inflation that came to a close in 
the early 1990s.249  Asano Shinpo owned Bito Shōji (Beautiful Metropolis 
Trading).250  He set his sights on a potential development property that was 
tied up by tenants with long-term land and building leases.251  He judged that 
the total cost of the property, including purchase money and “departure 
money” needed to buy out the lessees, would total roughly 200 million 
yen.252  The steps in Asano’s simple plan—to purchase the land, to arrange 
by some means for surrender by the tenants, and to cover these costs through 
a sale—were a common pattern in the overheated market of the time.253  On 
March 28, 1984, Asano borrowed 180 million yen from Sumimoto Takeichi, 
a grey-market lender.254  The loan was secured by a jōto tanpo in favor of 
Sumimoto, specifying direct foreclosure (i.e. an accounting to cut off the 
borrower’s right of redemption) as the sole means of realizing the security.255  
Sumimoto registered the transfer of ownership the following day, on March 
29.256 
Success in this transaction would have required that Asano find a 
buyer willing to go forward with a purchase.  However, he was unable to do 
so.  At the end of the loan term, on May 25, Asano paid four weeks’ advance 
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interest on the principle sum of 180,000,000 yen at four percent per month, 
and renewed the loan for that period.257  This process was repeated on June 
22, July 20, August 17, and September 14, each extension supported by a 
replacement promissory note exchanged with Sumimoto. 258   Asano 
continued to seek a buyer, and in July he was on the verge of concluding a 
sale; however, that sale fell through at the last minute, nothing further 
materialized, and on September 29, 1984, beset by his creditors, Asano 
Shinpo took his own life.259 
1. Mortgagee Went into Possession, Mortgagor Sought to Impose an 
Accounting 
Around October of 1986, 260  Sumimoto began operating a parking 
service on the property, which continued until the end of November 1991.261  
During this interval, the heirs of Asano’s estate attempted to waive their 
rights in the collateral and demand an accounting.262  Sumimoto refused to 
comply, and the heirs filed suit to compel the settlement of accounts in 
1992.263 
In the time between the loan to Asano and the lawsuit by his heirs, 
Japan’s Bubble Economy peaked, and then crashed,264 dragging down the 
value of collateral.  For purposes of the plaintiffs’ claim, the value of the 
property on July 5, 1988 (the date of the plaintiffs’ demand for an 
accounting) was determined to be 327,265,000 yen.265  After adjusting the 
rate of interest to bring it within the legal limit, the amount outstanding on 
the loan at the same point in time was fixed at 250,700,780 yen.266  Plaintiffs 
sought to recover the difference between those two sums. 
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2. Evidence of Forgery in the Record Highlights the Potential for 
Mortgagee Opportunism 
Sumimoto presented two core claims in defense.  The first depended 
on a second contract of conveyance dated April 26, 1984, which included an 
option to repurchase the property for 212,654,000 yen, expiring on August 
26, 1984.  Sumimoto asserted that this conveyance had terminated the jōto 
tanpo agreement four months before Asano’s death.267  To bolster this claim, 
at the third trial court hearing in the case, Sumimoto’s counsel proffered a 
document bearing Asano’s seal, which purported to agree to a final 
settlement of the jōto tanpo by offering the collateral as substitute 
performance of his obligations under the loan. 268   On the date of this 
document (April 26), the land had an appraised value of 134,250,000 yen,269 
which would have meant that Sumimoto agreed at that point to take a loss on 
the transaction.  Counsel proposed that this completed the loan agreement.270  
The court was not persuaded.  The trial judge found the memorandum of 
consent to be a forgery and refused to treat the second contract as a genuine 
sale, in light of Asano’s subsequent payments of interest on the full amount 
of the loan, the absence of any evidence that Sumimoto had given notice of 
any accounting settlement, and the failure of Sumimoto to register the 
second contract in the full month between the expiration of the option and 
Asano’s suicide.271  The trial court held that, like the first agreement, the 
second contract created an executory jōto tanpo between Asano and 
Sumimoto, under which Asano retained an equitable interest in the 
property.272 
3. Granting Mortgagor the Power to Demand an Accounting Would 
Deny the Mortgagee Control over the Timing of a Sale 
In the alternative, Sumimoto asserted that the debtor in a jōto tanpo 
relationship cannot compel the creditor to complete an accounting and 
terminate the relationship until the creditor signals his intention to realize the 
collateral.273  Under existing precedent, this condition would be satisfied by 
one of three events:  1) sale to a third party; 2) notice of intent to claim 
unencumbered ownership; or 3) notice that the obligation exceeds the value 
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of the property.274  Because none of these events transpired, and because 
Asano’s heirs had no interest in redeeming the property (after 1990 it had 
declined greatly in value), counsel for Sumimoto maintained that the duty to 
account never arose.275 
Both the Osaka District Court and the Osaka High Court held for 
Asano’s heirs, and ordered that an accounting be made.276  The Supreme 
Court reversed, adopting Sumimoto’s conditional accounting argument in its 
judgment, reasoning that the contrary rule would permit speculation by the 
debtor and deny the secured lender the value of its security.277 
4. Irrelevance of Mortgagee Entry into Possession 
Setting aside the matter of forgery, this result makes sense but for one 
fact:  the entry into possession by the mortgagee.  Given that his claim was 
limited to sums due, a mortgagee in possession of property with a value that 
significantly exceeds the sums it secures has little incentive to put the 
collateral to productive use.  Taking the Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate case as 
an example, the value of the property would have increased substantially 
during the three years between October 1986 and the collapse of the Bubble 
Economy in 1990; it is questionable whether its highest and best use was as 
a parking lot.  English law addresses the moral hazard that arises under these 
conditions by affixing a mortgagee in possession with an affirmative duty to 
maximize the income derived from the property for the benefit of the 
debtor.278  This is one of the reasons that mortgagees in England generally 
seek possession only with a view to an immediate sale.279 
5. The Judgment in Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate Is Grounded in 
Doctrinal Formalism 
The Supreme Court’s indifference to the state of possession speaks to 
the historical origins of the jōto tanpo interest.  As related above, both 
possessory and non-possessory pledges of land were known to Tokugawa 
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land practice, and both persisted into the early Meiji era. 280   With the 
introduction of the Civil Code, the informal practice of “title-transfer 
security” was championed by the Code’s drafters on the grounds of 
contractual freedom.281  To support this view, the courts applied what might 
be described as a “thin trust” concept to these transactions, under which 
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code and the register continued to 
determine property relations with third parties, while the “inner 
relationship”282 between mortgagor and mortgagee was entirely governed by 
agreement between the parties.283  Because the primary doctrinal objective 
was to insulate these transactions from the terms of the Civil Code, courts 
did not interpret the “trust” or “trust-like” verbiage to impose special duties 
on the trustee; therefore, the state of possession was treated as a term for the 
parties to settle between themselves.  As the Sumimoto decision illustrates, 
the Supreme Court has remained true to these roots, favoring the 
preservation of a narrow doctrinal integrity over commercial fairness and 
efficiency. 
In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for Sumimoto stressed 
that Asano’s heirs were pursuing a selfish gain in attempting to obtain an 
accounting during the boom phase of the market.284  While this is certainly 
the case, Sumimoto also kept his options open.  The second contract, for sale 
with an option to repurchase, is inherently ambiguous and invites 
opportunism by the lender: modeled as a jōto tanpo, it leaves the lender (in a 
falling market) free to pursue the borrower for sums due; if modeled as a 
sale, the lender (in a rising market) is free to stand on the option and retain 
interest payments made in the interim.  From the fact findings in the case, it 
appears that Sumimoto attempted to remove the speculative ambiguity of the 
transaction after the fact through forgery. 
D. Under Current Precedent, Mortgagee Opportunism Within the Jōto 
Tanpo Relationship Is Not Susceptible to Judicial Discipline 
As the cases above illustrate, inefficiencies arise from the potential for 
ambiguity in contract paper and the limitations of the registration system; 
but the core of the inflexibility of judicial treatment lies in the “thin trust” 
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concept that underpins the jōto tanpo interest.  Where a security arrangement 
is identified on the facts, the doctrinal separation of “inner relations” and 
“outer relations” under a thin trust dictates that preference must be given to 
the register.  The same thin-trust framework inhibits the courts from policing 
creditor opportunism within the scope of “inner relations” between the 
original parties to the transaction.  Given these consequences of the thin-
trust concept, opportunism within the jōto tanpo relationship cannot be fully 
controlled through the further refinement of judicial doctrine.  This series of 
unfortunate circumstances gives pause to consider whether sustaining jōto 
tanpo as a viable security interest is an appropriate objective.  If jōto tanpo 
performs no function that is not equally well served by the orthodox 
hypothec and root hypothec interests, it may be appropriate to reverse the 
policy of sustaining its value. 
V. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
The historical role of jōto tanpo was to help creditors and debtors skirt 
inadequacies in Japan’s system for enforcing secured claims in real property; 
but a jōto tanpo in real estate, by its very nature, creates an off-register 
interest that raises problems of information asymmetry.  As a result, jōto 
tanpo arrangements have always been afflicted by problems of strategic 
bargaining and opportunism.  Nonetheless, when the enforcement system 
was particularly broken—and during a period of particularly rapid economic 
expansion—jōto tanpo helped to support the transactions that other security 
interests could not reach.285  Today, the terrain has shifted.  Japan has greatly 
reformed its civil enforcement system and, by most accounts, the system is 
now performing well. 286   This has changed creditor behavior and, 
accordingly, the role played by jōto tanpo in real estate transactions.  Its use 
has declined, and the latter two of the three cases discussed above illustrate 
the niche that it fills today:  a halfway house between default and execution, 
favored by lenders whose business model does not depend on a reputation 
for patient equanimity. 
The litigation environment has also changed substantially since the 
heyday of non-Code security interests in real estate.  The Japanese courts 
                                           
285
 See supra Parts III, III(A), & III(B). 
286
 Ōsawa Akira, Minkan keibai dōnyū no kanōsei [The Possibility of Introducing Private Auctions], 
1774 JUNKAN KIN’YŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 1 (June 25, 2006) (citing a 98% rate of successful clearance at judicial 
auctions in Tokyo—and similarly strong performances by the current civil execution system in other 
regions of the country—as a leading reason for lack of interest in a proposal to introduce U.S.-style private 
mortgage auction procedures in Japan,). 
504 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 3 
 
processed more than four times the number of cases in 2005 than 1975.287  
Over the same period, the total staff contingent of the court system has 
grown by less than four percent. 288   Benefits of office automation 
notwithstanding, the pressures on judicial time are far greater today than in 
the past.  Therefore, it is not surprising that in the progressive refinement of 
jōto tanpo rules, the Japanese Supreme Court has (to borrow a phrase from 
Professor Carol Rose) preferred “crystals” to “mud,” 289  formalism over 
flexibility. 
This is evident in the treatment of third-party transfers, where the 
Court has held firmly to a rule that can be applied on the face of the register, 
with a minimum of supplementary fact-finding.  By ruling the doctrine of 
notice inapplicable to third-party transfers, courts are able to evaluate 
transfers without looking behind them.  This rule contributes to the faster 
disposition of cases, but it is also an example of legal hypertrophy—
insistence on the ever more exacting adherence to a principle that actually 
aggravates an underlying problem.290 
Certain inefficiencies are inherent in the jōto tanpo form in the current 
state of the law, including the ambiguous foundation of the relationship 
itself, the temptations to forgery, the impossibility of imposing a 
comprehensive foreclosure action, and the possibility of attachment in the 
hands of the lender.  These inefficiencies dictate that such transactions will 
continue to be an engine of litigation.  In the modern environment, a root 
hypothec provides adequate security for the lender, without these risks and 
inefficiencies.  As Professor Grant Nelson has argued with respect to the 
analogous contract for deed in the United States,291 it would be preferable to 
normalize the jōto tanpo and bring it within the mainstream framework—
now well tested—for realizing security. 
A. Foreign Examples, Although a Useful Reference, Are Not Directly 
Applicable to the Japanese Context 
As the case of Nakano v. Okamura illustrates, jōto tanpo presents a 
special difficulty for Japan’s system of title registration because the lender 
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holds ostensible title to the collateral.292  As indicated in the discussion of 
that case, the English courts have chosen to discourage equitable mortgages 
(in which the borrower is the ostensible owner, and the lender has only an 
equitable claim), simply by refusing to recognize that passing the certificate 
of title registration to the lender has any legal effect.293  The jōto tanpo 
transaction cannot be so easily discouraged.  In the state of Louisiana, where 
the property system also has civil law roots, a security interest can be created 
in exactly the same way as a jōto tanpo, using an outright conveyance to the 
lender, accompanied by a counter-letter promising reconveyance to the 
borrower upon repayment. 294   However, there is again an important 
difference from Japan:  Louisiana conveyancing is supported by a system of 
recorded deeds,295 under which the borrower is able to protect his interest 
simply by filing the counter-letter that he receives from the creditor. 296  
Unlike Japan (with its system of registered title), in Louisiana there are no 
special formal restrictions on what may be filed; the document is simply 
added to the public record, for possible reference in case of future dispute.  
In the event that the creditor sells the collateral to a third party, the correct 
result for the court is straightforward:  if the counter-letter has been filed, the 
borrower’s interest is protected; if the counter-letter has not been filed, his 
interest is not.297  Because Japanese property registers are organized not as a 
deed recording system, but as a system of registered title, the borrower who 
once conveys title to his lender thereby loses access to the entry, and cannot 
register his (equitable) right to a reconveyance of the property. 
When it comes to the jōto tanpo against real estate, Japanese judges 
are thus presented with an indigestible cocktail—a permissive contractual 
approach to security similar to that of Louisiana, backed up by a strict 
registration system similar to that of England.  Strict application of the 
curtain principle (i.e. honoring all transactions that are based upon the 
content of the register) has the effect of encouraging jōto tanpo transactions, 
despite their inefficiency.  Judicial precedent has very nearly reached its 
limit; a full resolution to this dilemma will require legislative intervention.  
As demonstrated by the Mortgages Act 1978, enhanced powers of judicial 
management can be a key to discouraging opportunistic use of an interest. 
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B. The Special Character of Jōto Tanpo Against Real Estate Could Be 
Clarified By Explicit Statutory Recognition 
One of the doctrinal difficulties of current law is that jōto tanpo 
against both movables and immovables is sustained by the same thin-trust 
concept, using the same terminology.298  The bulk of jōto tanpo litigation 
relates to secured claims in movables, where it plays a vital economic role as 
the only available form of non-possessory security.  Explicit statutory 
recognition of jōto tanpo in real estate as a discrete type of security interest 
would make it clear that these are separate threads of law and would support 
the independent development of rules appropriate to the physical and legal 
character of the respective assets involved. 
Under current doctrine, both the stated cause of a transfer of 
ownership and the actual cause are ignored.  As indicated by the Supreme 
Court in Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate, this is intended to reduce the 
transaction costs of conveyancing by encouraging purchasers to trust the 
content of the register.299  Paradoxically, this rule increases the fact-finding 
burden on courts by enabling and rewarding obfuscation of the true intention 
behind such transfers. 
The cause of registration that ultimately appears on the register is 
drawn from a recitation in the contract of conveyance, which must accord 
with a similar recitation in the power of attorney that authorizes the change 
to the register.  Both of these documents must bear the debtor’s seal, and it is 
therefore within the debtor’s power to negotiate over the published 
characterization of the transaction.  However, the debtor has a much reduced 
incentive to do so, because neither actual nor constructive notice affect the 
power of the creditor to convey good title to a third party.  The creditor, on 
the other hand, benefits in two ways from concealing the character of the 
transaction from the register.  First, this preserves the possibility of 
speculation, as seen in Nakano v. Okamura.300  Second, because jōto tanpo is 
known to be both afflicted by legal ambiguity and associated with lenders 
who operate on the fringes of the law, risk-averse purchasers will discount or 
avoid properties with a jōto tanpo registration in the chain of title, reducing 
their sale value. 
Application of the doctrine of notice would give the debtor an 
incentive to negotiate for the explicit characterization of jōto tanpo as the 
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cause of registration.  This would both reduce the burdens of fact finding in 
litigation, and provide a foundation for the more orderly disposition of 
collateral.  Binding takers with actual notice of a jōto tanpo that has not been 
registered would reduce the potential for creditors to avoid this rule.  The 
effect of the doctrine of notice would be to force the parties into a bilateral 
monopoly, which may result in deadlock if the parties cannot agree on a 
valuation of the collateral.  Permitting conversion of a jōto tanpo interest to 
a root hypothec on petition by either party would cover this contingency, by 
providing an orderly exit path from the relationship.  Finally, statutory 
recognition would open the path to affixing lenders in possession with an 
explicit duty to maximize the value of the collateral, whether through sale or 
through management of the property. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Japanese property system has undergone considerable elaboration 
and development since the release of restraints on alienation by the Meiji 
reformers.  The jōto tanpo interest has played an important role in that 
transformation.  This history and its outcomes provide important insight into 
the internal dynamics of a young property system undergoing change. 
Each phase of legal development examined in this Article, from the 
watershed settlement of alienable rights of ownership onward, was shaped in 
important ways by experience with preexisting interests.  Reformers at each 
stage have faced considerable pressure from contemporary stakeholders to 
cover, at minimum, the known transactional needs of the time.  The 
successful adoption and development of the Japanese property system 
suggests that the rights it has deployed, in whatever form, have been 
sufficiently flexible to cover those transactional needs, and were consistently 
backed up, through whatever procedure, by adequate legal mechanisms for 
their enforcement. 
This incremental narrative contrasts with the persistent view that 
Japan presents a hopeful sort of paradox:  a market system that has 
succeeded despite systematic enforcement failure.301  As a recent study put it, 
Japan’s new property law was “not matched by the development of 
complementary enforcement mechanisms,”302 a shortcoming overcome by 
spontaneous extra-legal factors such that “[t]his gap did not prove to be 
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wholly problematic.”303  The above survey of the historical role of jōto tanpo 
in real estate transactions suggests that the first recourse for parties frustrated 
by inadequate enforcement mechanisms is to seek alternatives within the 
state-sponsored legal framework itself.  If that is so, and if they find those 
alternatives—as they seem to have done in this instance—then the 
availability of enforcement may be more important than this view might 
otherwise suggest. 
The jōto tanpo against real estate with an opportunity for forfeiture, as 
an adaptation of feudal-era practice, took root as a customary form of 
“mortgage,” in the early decades of the Japanese system of private 
ownership.  Its subsequent recognition under the Civil Code was justified on 
the narrow ideological assumption that introducing contractual freedom into 
the core of property law would produce economic benefits.  The interest 
served an important role as a tool for secured lending during the nation’s 
early period of industrialization.  During the swell in economic activity in 
the second half of the twentieth century, however, its inefficiencies, which 
manifested themselves in the form of hardship on the debtor and rude 
surprises for his general creditors, attracted judicial intervention.  Since that 
time, resort to this interest has been incrementally curtailed, until today, 
where it is primarily associated with collection efforts against debtors 
already in distress.  The position of jōto tanpo within the universe of real 
estate transactions is thus not the result of enforcement failure, but of 
enforcement arbitrage. 
Japan’s property system, on the contrary, can be said to have been 
afflicted by a surfeit of enforcement.  During the period of rapid 
development, the entrepreneurial exercise of substantive legal rights to 
achieve inequitable results threatened the perceived legitimacy of legal 
institutions themselves.  The restrictions on execution officers introduced by 
the Bailiffs Act of 1966304 were a response to this challenge.  The same can 
be said of the root hypothec added to the Civil Code in 1969,305 of the 
Mortgages Act 1978,306 of the procedural reform of auction and attachment 
proceedings introduced in 1979,307 and of the removal of the super-priority 
for short-term leases in 2003.308  Each of these reforms reduced the relative 
attractiveness of the non-Code security devices, but the first of them—the 
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Bailiffs Act of 1966—had the effect of weakening, not strengthening, the 
civil enforcement system. 
Hemmed in by the constraints of the real estate registration system 
and the Civil Code, jōto tanpo has reached its natural limits as a judicial 
construct.  The need to protect the integrity of registration, together with the 
pressures of judicial administration, have driven the courts to adopt a highly 
formalistic and inflexible approach to this ostensibly equitable transaction.  
It remains to be seen whether the current round of revisions to the property 
section of the Civil Code will touch the jōto tanpo in real estate; but it 
nonetheless seems inevitable that the inherent flaws of this transactional 
form will invite a response in due course.  Time will tell what form it takes. 
